Res Judicata, Lache, and Time Limitations are not Applicable to Void Orders/Judgments, which must be set aside.

Please visit my new BLOG: MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments – WordPress.com

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Corrupt judges like John D. Rainey, Janis Graham Jack, S. Thomas Anderson, Skipper Koetter, Kemper Stephen Williams; unethical lawyers like Richard T. Chapman, David Roberts, Randal W. Hill, Jameson B. Carroll, Emily T. Landry, Ron McAfee, Edward Bearman; ignorant/discriminatory ADA Shannon Salyer, Sheriff B.B. Browning & Magistrate Hope Kurtz, crooks and fraudsters like Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and those named and unnamed in my posts: They have seized upon the government by bribery and corruption. They have made speculation and public robbery a science. They have loaded the nation, the state, the county, and the city with debt. — Quotes from Denis Kearney (1847–1907), a late 19th century California labor leader, applied to some Texas’s and Tennessee’s rotten, immoral, despicable OFFICERS OF THE COURT and two major crooks and fraudsters.

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Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom.

While teaching, I also worked undercover in the lower courts by saying I was a young law teacher wanting experience in criminal law. The judges were happy to assist me but what I learned was how corrupt the lower courts were. Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom. —  Samuel Dash

Samuel Dash (February 27, 1925 – May 29, 2004) was an American professor of law who acted as a co-chief counsel along with Fred Thompson for the Senate Watergate Committee during the Watergate scandal. Dash became famous for his televised interrogations during the hearings held by the United States Congress on the Watergate incident. — From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ha! Judge Skipper Koetter seems a lot wiser in that he concealed the moneys under the cover of campaign contributions and that he managed not to accept money in the courtroom, I guess.  But a reasonable man cannot rule out his accepting money in his chambers, bedchambers, or living room, can he? One of my former attorneys mentioned that the most effective way for money to change hands had been knowingly and willfully losing the chips to the judge in the poker game in a private group. See Judge Skipper Koetter’s Campaign Finance Suspected of Bribery Posted on September 29, 2012.

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Res Judicata, Lache, and Time Limitations are not applicable to Void Orders/Judgments, which must be set aside.

  1. Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one which, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect, Allcock v. Allcock 437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982).
  2. “…laches does not run against a void judgment. See Samango v. Hobbs, supra; People’s National Bank of Reynoldsville, to Use of Mottern v. D.&M Coal Co., 124 Pa. Super. 21 A. 452.” Com. v. Miller, 150 A.2d 585, 588 (1959)
  3. A motion to set aside a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction is not subject to the time limitations of Rule 60(b). See Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986).
  4. A void judgment is one which from the beginning was complete nullity and without any legal effect, Hobbs v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456      (M.D. Fla. 1980).
  5. A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of enforcement in any manner or to any degree – Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985).
  6. When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not      discretionary matter, but is mandatory, Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).
  7. Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set      aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278.

* Those who are seeking relief from void judgments, please read the following carefully: 1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment 2. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment.

The merits in this pro se litigant’s Rule 60 Motion and Memorandum soundly support her cause, outweighing the minor typographical or grammatical errors.

Paul Chen

E-mail Addresses:
fraudonthecourt@yahoo.com
pc886405@yahoo.com

Posted in FRAUD ON THE COURT, Suing officers of the court | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

District Judges Rainey, Jack and the Other Judiciaries are not Immune from Suit for Damages

 No Notice, No Jurisdiction, No Authority to Grant Relief, and the Judgment is VOID!

  1. “It is fundamental that no judgment or order affecting the rights of a party to the cause shall be made or rendered without noticeto the party whose rights are to be affected.” Tyron Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Phelps, 307 S.C. 361, 362, 415 S.E.2d 397, 398 (1992). Generally, a person against whom a judgment or order is taken without notice may rightly ignore it and may assume that no court will enforce it against his person or property. Id.
  2. See Stuck v. Medical Examiners, 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389. Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proven to exist.See also Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215., There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.” See also Rosemond V. Lambert, 469 F2d 416., The burden shifts to the courts to prove jurisdiction.
  3. If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn’t any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120-c.) An illegal order is forever void.

Four Factors to Determine whether a Judge’s Act is a “Judicial” One

  1. To determine whether a judge’s act is a “judicial”
    one, the Court is to consider four factors: (1) whether the act complained of is one normally performed by a judge; (2) whether the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge; and (4) whether the act arose out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir.1993).

(1) whether the act complained of is one normally performed by a judge: Rainey’s imposing on this indigent Plaintiff the Clerk’s duties to “issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(d), and refusing to reinstate the complaints dismissed sua sponte under Rule 1-041(E)(2) of Rules Enabling Act, which is mandatory, are not acts normally performed by a judge.

(2) whether the act occurred in the courtroom or an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers: The acts neither occurred in the courtroom nor an appropriate adjunct such as the judge’s chambers because without service of process, no parties were present, and there was no subject matter before the judge for adjudication;

(3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge: Since there was neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction, there was no controversy that centered around any case pending before the judge and

(4) whether the act arose out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity: The decision was made in his administrative, ministerial, non-judicial, non-adjudicative, personal, private-citizen capacity. Without subject matter and parties before him, whatever he did was not done in his judicial, but personal, capacity.

Two Circumstances When a Judge is not Entitled to Judicial Immunity

5. There are only two circumstances when a judge is not entitled to judicial immunity: (1) when he performs acts not in his judicial capacity and (2) when he performs act, although judicial in nature, in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). Here, Judge Rainey is not entitled to judicial immunity because (1) when he rendered the Order to Dismiss without prejudice, he was not performing acts in his judicial capacity; 2) he was making an administrative, ministerial, non-judicial, non-adjudicative decision; and (2) when he performs act, although judicial in nature, in the complete absence of all jurisdiction: neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction was present; he was without any authority to hear the case and determine any issue.

See other related posts.

Posted by Paul Chen: ricofraudonthecourt@wordpress.com

E-mail Addresses: ricofraudonthecourt@yahoo.com
pc886405@yahoo.com

Posted in FRAUD ON THE COURT, Suing officers of the court | Tagged | Leave a comment

MOTION TO VACATE THE FINAL JUDGMENT, REINSTATE THE CASE and COMPLAINT AGAINST DEPRIVATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

THIS POST IS REVSIED AS:

MOTION TO VACATE THE FINAL JUDGMENT, REINSTATE THE CASE and COMPLAINT AGAINST DEPRIVATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS (revised) Posted on March 25, 2013

Click on the above link instead of reading the contents below.

The revision is stylistic; the contents remain unchanged!

 

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Corrupt judges like John D. Rainey, Janis Graham Jack, S. Thomas Anderson, Skipper Koetter, Kemper Stephen Williams; unethical lawyers like Richard T. Chapman, David Roberts, Randal W. Hill, Jameson B. Carroll, Emily T. Landry, Ron McAfee, Edward Bearman; ignorant/discriminatory ADA Shannon Salyer, Sheriff B.B. Browning & Magistrate Hope Kurtz, crooks and fraudsters like Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and those named and unnamed in my posts: They have seized upon the government by bribery and corruption. They have made speculation and public robbery a science. They have loaded the nation, the state, the county, and the city with debt. — Quotes from Denis Kearney (1847–1907), a late 19th century California labor leader, applied to some Texas’s and Tennessee’s rotten, immoral, despicable OFFICERS OF THE COURT and two major crooks and fraudsters.

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Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom.

While teaching, I also worked undercover in the lower courts by saying I was a young law teacher wanting experience in criminal law. The judges were happy to assist me but what I learned was how corrupt the lower courts were. Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom. —  Samuel Dash

Samuel Dash (February 27, 1925 – May 29, 2004) was an American professor of law who acted as a co-chief counsel along with Fred Thompson for the Senate Watergate Committee during the Watergate scandal. Dash became famous for his televised interrogations during the hearings held by the United States Congress on the Watergate incident. — From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ha! Judge Skipper Koetter seems a lot wiser in that he concealed the moneys under the cover of campaign contributions and that he managed not to accept money in the courtroom, I guess.  But a reasonable man cannot rule out his accepting money in his chambers, bedchambers, or living room, can he? One of my former attorneys mentioned that the most effective way for money to change hands had been knowingly and willfully losing the chips to the judge in the poker game in a private group. See Judge Skipper Koetter’s Campaign Finance Suspected of Bribery Posted on September 29, 2012.

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Posted in FRAUD ON THE COURT | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 18 Comments

PREPARE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WITHOUT A LAWYER

PREPARE TO FILE A PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WITHOUT A LAWYER

Please click the above link to view the contents posted at the new BLOG, MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments.

Paul Chen

Posted in FRAUD ON THE COURT | 3 Comments

JUDGE JUERGEN (SKIPPER) KOETTER: My readers were wrong! So was I!

Please visit my new BLOG: MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments.

My readers were wrong about why I closed the BLOG! I was wrong about the bribe/reward/donation, Your Honor!

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Today marks the 4th Anniversary of the 7/15/2010 hearing held by Judge Skipper Koetter whose jurisdiction, authority, and power to hear the cases have been repeatedly challenged. However, he has never complied with the law. Specifically, when my opponents were proved to lack standing and the court had no subject matter jurisdiction, prior to the hearing, he was supposed to have required them to demonstrate that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the matters and parties before it. But he never did!   On June 4, 2014, I submitted a VERIFIED MOTION TO REOPEN Cause No. 12-4-1596. Without even reading the COVER of my Motion, (See COVER CAUSE NO. 12-4-1596)  on June 17, 2014 he signed an ORDER OF DISMISSAL (See 1) 6 17 14 ORDER OF DISMISSAL; 2) July 11, 2014 (Delivered on July 14, 2014 at 10.06 am) COVER LETTER TO THE DISTRICT CLERK) with his eyes half closed, not to speak of reading my 64- page, 208-paragraph non-frivolous pleadings substantiated by sufficient facts, relevant law, case law, statutes, rules, Texas and U.S. Constitutional provisions that safeguard our “LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY.” — All my pleadings will be gradually and systematically posted here through Claim-by-Claim Presentation and Issue-by-Issue Analysis for the benefit of those pro se litigants who have been following me for over two years.

ADVANCE NOTICE:

1. I have made sufficient preparations for MANDAMUS PETITION for years so that the Thirteenth Court of Appeals may compel Judge Koetter to vacate all the challenged VOID Orders/Judgments in due course.

2. Based upon my intensive and extensive legal research for the past ten years, I’ll disclose some tips to follow and some pitfalls to avoid regarding MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments in particular without any reservation.

3. Most importantly, please keep this controlling case law in mind: “When attacking a void order by mandamus, it is not necessary to show no adequate remedy at law exists.” See In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1007 WL 854253 (Tex. June 29, 2000)(per curiam). — This guiding principle is accepted by all the jurisdictions. *************************************************************************************                           

My readers were wrong! So was I, Your Honor!

1. My readers were wrong about why I closed the BLOG. I was neither bribed nor coerced into shutting it down. I did it upon reading the news report about your PUBLIC ADMONITION by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, (See 1) Victoria Advocate | Judicial conduct board reprimands judge; 2) PUBLIC ADMONITION of HONORABLE JUERGEN (SKIPPER) KOETTER; 3) [PDF] SkipperKoetter), and your intention of running for reelection. In order not to interfere with your reelection campaign, I closed it to the public temporarily in December 2013 with the expectation of urging you to perform your ministerial duty to vacate all the VOID Orders/Judgments rendered without subject matter jurisdiction. Meanwhile, with my permission, some of my followers have been able to access my BLOG posts without any interruptions.

2. I was wrong about the bribe/reward/donation given to you by David Roberts and his law firm, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey, & Witte, LLP, in the guise of campaign contributions. It was not $1,850.10 but $5,900.10, which was reported by THE TEXAS TRIBUNE and Texas Ethics Commission’s website without calculating any under-the-table transactions!

3. Whether it was labeled a bribe, a reward, or a donation, you violated Canon 4 D (4)(c) (You may accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or person whose interests have come or are likely to come before you, the judge) and the Bribery Statute 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), which prohibits giving “anything of value” to a present, past, or future public official “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official.” You are such a public official, aren’t you?

4. On July 15, 2010, David Roberts and his law firm, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey, & Witte, LLP, the donors, were a party to the lawsuit whose interests came before you, the judge, for adjudication.

5. $5,900.10 is more than “anything of value”, isn’t it? Not to mention what changed hands under the table! They gave $5,900.10 to a present, past, or future public official, you, “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official.” Sitting on the bench with or without jurisdiction, you are such a public official, aren’t you? From now on, this BLOG will be focusing on all your wrongdoings since July 15, 2010. Most of the posts published will be based on the past, present, and future court records. To avoid being tiresome and burdensome to the laypersons, I am trying to make each post as short, concise, and understandable as possible.

Is this Judge Juergen (Skipper) Koetter? Click for the face!

If this is you, Judge Koetter, you are guilty of rendering six VOID Orders/Judgments and refusing to perform your non-judicial/ministerial/administrative duty to vacate the challenged VOID Orders/Judgments. Thus, you are subject to MANDAMUS proceedings and TSCJC investigations! Was it you, the district judge that frequently played cards with Mr. Roberts? Card game is one of the best ways to change money under the table, isn’t it?

See you at the 13th Court of Appeals and the State Commission on Judicial Conduct hearings in the near future!

Dollars

$300 only? For my massage, counselor? If you are serious about winning in my courtroom, I can take $900 instead of my regular price of $1,000.

Yes, your honor!

Don’t come into my chambers with cash. Let’s meet somewhere else!

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Lawyer man and his client

Don’t worry, Paul! If you can raise $10,000 cash by Friday, I promise the judgment will be on our side.

Are you sure, David?

Of course, I am sure. I know the judge well enough to play cards with him every weekend.

Are you bribing him?

Nope. He can’t be bribed! So I don’t bribe him; I just let him win the $10,000 in the card games.

 

TO BE CONTINUED.

* I have just created a new BLOG, mandamusvoidorders@wordpress.com.  From now on, all the new posts related to MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments will be published at the new BLOG site. Thank you for your visit and please don’t hesitate to give some feedback!

Paul Chen

 

 

Posted in Anita L. Koop, Anita's Resort Properties Inc., Conspiracy, Corruption, David Roberts, due process of law, Egregious Misconduct, false arrest, FRAUD ON THE COURT, Fraudulent Concealment, Intentional Misrepresentation, Intrinsic/Extrinsic Fraud, Judge Juergen "Skipper" Koetter, Judge Skipper Koetter, JUDGE SKIPPER KOETTER'S JUDICIAL & NON-JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, Kenneth Burch, malicious prosecution, MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments, Perjured Testimony, Perjury, Racketeering Activity, Randal W. Hill, Roberts Roberts Odefey Witte LLP, Suing officers of the court, Terry J. Cox, Thomas George, VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS, wrongful imprisonment | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

DAVID ROBERTS PERJURED UNDER OATH & COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COURT

Please visit my new BLOG: MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments.

783 F2d 767 United States v. Roberts | OpenJurist

David William Roberts appeals from his convictions on one count of bank fraud, one count of bankruptcy fraud, and two counts of perjury.  We affirm the convictions on all counts, but remand to the district court for modification of its order regarding restitution.

Is this you, Mr. Roberts? One count of bank fraud, one count of bankruptcy fraud, and two counts of perjury?

First refer to: David Roberts’ $1,850.15 Reward Tainted Judge Skipper Koetter’s 7/15/10 Hearing Posted on November 20, 2013, please. The following excerpts are from the above. Will add more of this attorney’s misconduct, e.g., violation of automatic stay  and ineffective counsel assistance (See AMENDED Cover Letter + PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 Posted on May 23, 2013.):

On 7/15/10, David Roberts committed perjury under oath by stating that his law firm had a 10-year policy of destroying clients’ files.

No man has a good enough memory to be a successful liar. —  Abraham Lincoln — How can I disagree with our Honest Abe?  You don’t have a good enough memory of what you wrote in the emails, do you, Mr. Roberts? No wonder you committed perjury under oath at the court hearing on 7/15/10 without remembering what you wrote on Fri, Apr 30, 2004 07:13 AM!  What an unsuccessful liar! Shame on you!

Count 26: The concealment or destruction of documents relating to the property or affairs of the debtor. — 18 U.S.C. §152(8): Excerpted from Complaint #2 in CIVIL ACTION V-06-78 filed on 3/14/06 available at PACER (E-mail correspondence with Roberts preserved for jury trial.) See Civil Action: 6:05-mc-00002   03/14/2006 AMENDED PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT # 2 Posted on April 16, 2012:

4. Chen’s former real estate attorney David Roberts, Esq. & Roberts, Roberts & Odefey, LLP, knowingly and fraudulently concealed, destroyed, or mutilated the recorded information under his custody (including books, legal documents, litigation papers, transaction records, escrow account records, etc.) In spite of his knowledge that such information is indispensable to Chen’s preparation for the COMPLAINTS to be filed at this Court, he first agreed by e-mail

(Fri, Apr 30, 2004 07:13 AM) to retrieve the documents at a cost of $225. Chen’s friend agreed to help pay for the service and contacted Roberts in person, by phone and by e-mail many times in vain. Eventually, Roberts even ignored the phone calls without returning calls or responding to e-mails from either Chen or his friend. Though with a long-term friendly attorney-client relationship, personally Chen holds no grudge against David Roberts, Esq. & Roberts, Roberts & Odefey, LLP, the latter’s recent misconduct made it necessary for Plaintiff to take appropriate actions for self-protection.

5. Who Does the File Belong To?

The primary Texas case regarding access to client files in the absence of litigation between the attorney and client is Resolution Trust Corporation v. H_____, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647 (N. D. Tex. 1989). The opinion does not explicitly say that the entire file belongs to the client, though that is certainly the direction that Judge Sanders’ opinion was headed. The opinion holds that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to the client and, as a result, cannot conceal any file documents from the client, even if there is no current dispute between the attorney and the client. His ruling extends to documents such as attorney notes and memoranda. Note that Rule 76a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure makes some discovery documents “court records” which neither the attorney nor the client can destroy. Disciplinary Rule 1.15(d) provides that an attorney “may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law only if such retention will not prejudice the client in the subject matter of the representation.” (Emphasis added). The primary circumstance in which “other law” permits an attorney to retain the file is when the client has not paid for legal services and the attorney asserts a lien on the file.

In some cases, prejudice to the client from the attorney’s retention of the file will be apparent. For example, if the client is getting new counsel in the case and the file is needed to prepare adequately for a hearing scheduled in a matter of days, prejudice is likely. In general, prejudice to the client is arguable in many situations if the case is still active in some manner or actions can be taken to change the effects of the work of the attorney. Suppose, however, that the case is over, the client lost, and all appeal deadlines are over. Does it “prejudice the client in the subject matter of the representation” not to have the file to give to a new attorney so he can determine if you committed malpractice? The safest course of action is to make the file available to the client in some way. Otherwise, part of the factual presentation in the malpractice suit will be a recitation of how the attorney attempted to cover up his mistake by retaining the “client’s” file.

Under the Resolution Trust Corporation v. H_____, P.C case, the attorney is required to turnover the file to the client without having the client pay for copies. The attorney is permitted, however, to copy anything he or she may want at his or her own expense.

In light of the above case law, Roberts is required to turnover the files to Chen without having Chen pay for copies. Consequently, it was tantamount to extortion for Roberts to demand that Chen pay $225 for making copies and that Chen acquire the optical drive for document retrieval at a cost of $40,000.

Roberts is also responsible for ineffective counsel assistance in connection with identifying Cox’s agent status for Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. and for his failure to investigate the lack of standing of Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., and the Trial Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which are the reasons why he was listed in the civil rights action: AMENDED Cover Letter + PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 Posted on May 23, 2013.

In COMPLAINT # 2, Chen specifically demands judgment against Roberts for breach of fiduciary duty and ineffective representation in defending the wrongful foreclosure and fraudulent deficiency judgment; —.

In Causes Nos. 10-6-28, 10-6-29 & 12-4-1596, Judge Koetter rendered VOID Orders/Judgments without any jurisdiction or inconsistent with due process of law. Consequently, all those Orders/Judgments are VOID ab initio. They may be vacated with litigants’ motions or the court can and must set them aside sua sponte.

Chen contends that due process was not accorded him and other interested parties in Causes Nos. 10-6-28, 10-6-29 & 12-4-1596. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction failed in these Koetter courts because of the following specific reasons: Judge Koetter (1) did not follow statutory procedure without requiring Plaintiffs to prove existence of subject matter jurisdiction when Chen challenged the court’s lack of it, See Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill 140, 143 (1921) (If a court’s decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void), See, e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995); 2) did not act impartially and did not even have any appearance of impartiality (See transcripts), See Bracey V Warden, U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997); (3) violated due process in holding the July 15, 2010 hearing by ambush (lack of pretrial discovery thwarted justice, & allowing Chen only 4 days to prepare for the hearing in the absence of the subpoenaed witnesses: Judge John D. Rainey, his case manager Ms. Joyce Richards, Terry J. Cox and Anita L. Koop, who all evaded the subpoena services) and rendering the July 15, 2010 Judgment in conspiracy with Plaintiffs David Roberts, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP, et al. as well as the November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment for Anita’s Resort Properties., Inc. which has had no standing since 6.5.1993, See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019(193 ; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936); (4) committed fraud upon the court by acting in manner inconsistent with due process of law and acting unconstitutionally in entering the purported orders and final judgments, See In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill, App. 3d 393(1962); (5) exceeded his statutory authority by labeling Chen “a vexatious litigant” and his lawsuits “frivolous” in the November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment without affording Chen an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way in contravention of the Texas Open Courts Doctrine, See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); (6) committed fraud in the procurement of jurisdiction in conspiracy with Plaintiffs Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., David Roberts, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP, et al., See Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E. 2d 893 (1985); (7) immediately after the July 15, 2010 hearing, signed the purported Judicial Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusion prepared in advance by Plaintiffs’ three seasoned attorneys without changing a single word, without taking a glance at Chen’s pleadings filed in the record, and by giving away his bias, prejudice, discrimination, partiality and favoritism with his unspoken, unwritten, unconcealed, undisguised body language; (8) engaged in unlawful activity, particularly accepting two payments totalling $1,850.10 from one of the Plaintiffs, David Roberts, and his law firm, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP, in August, 2010 after the July 15, 2010 hearing, See Code of Judicial Conduct; (9) unlawfully denied Chen’s 1st Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances and violated TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE by willfully, erroneously, and maliciously labeling him “a vexatious litigant”, charging him with filing “frivolous” lawsuits and prohibiting him from filing any new petitions in the State of Texas, among others; (10) misinterpreting NOTICES OF LIS PENDEN. See AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING Posted on April 17, 2012“Absolute Privilege of Filing Notices of Lis Pendens v. Texas Penal Code – Section 32.49. Refusal To Execute Release Of Fraudulent Lien Or Claim” Posted on October 5, 2012; The Nature and Functions of a Notice of Lis Pendens Posted on October 4, 2012Offenses Against Public Administration, Bribery and Corrupt Influence, Perjury and Other Falsification Committed by David Roberts, Anita L. Koop, Terry J. Cox, et al. in Conspiracy with Judge Skipper Koetter in the Judicial Proceedings; Posted on December 21, 2012;

Roberts received Mr. Karl Hsieh’s $2,500 earnest money deposit on 5 vacant waterfront lots on Sailfish Landing, Sunilandings Phase I, Port Alto, owned by Carol Townsend without closing the transaction and without refunding Mr. Hsieh’s  $2,500 deposit. Instead, he illegally used it to pay off my Pre-Petition Attorneys’ fees in violation of the Automatic Stay Provision: Details to follow. 

These facts demonstrate how greedy, cheap, lawless, unethical, and despicable this attorney has been in dealing with his clients despite his being a licensed attorney in Texas for 39 years!

I have been accusing him and the other officers of the court of all sorts of wrongdoings. How come they dared NOT sue me for defamation? Because I have been telling the truth!

Even if you are a minority of one, the truth is the truth. —  Mahatma Gandhi

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

E-mail Addresses:

ricofraudonthecourt@yahoo.com

pc886405@yahoo.com

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David Roberts’ $1,850.15 Reward Tainted Judge Skipper Koetter’s 7/15/10 Hearing

Cause No. 10-6-29 Hearing Held on 7/15/10:

Analyzing Judge Skipper Koetter’s 7/15/10 Hearing Tainted with $1,850.15 Reward by David Roberts & Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP in August 2010. See Judge Skipper Koetter’s Campaign Finance Suspected of Bribery Posted on September 29, 2012; DAVID ROBERTS & JUDGE SKIPPER KOETTER VIOLATED BRIBERY STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 201 BY GIVING AND RECEIVING $1,850.10 IN AUGUST, 2010 AFTER THE 7/15/10 HEARING! Reposted for the Two Leading Men: Mr. Roberts & Judge Koetter. Posted on November 24, 2012 & JUDGE KOETTER: DON’T YOU KNOW YOU MUST RECUSE YOURSELF FROM PRESIDING OVER ANY CASE INVOLVING YOUR DONORS, be they parties or attorneys? Posted on November 15, 2012.

* Correction: The amount of Roberts Roberts & Odefey LLP’s contribution has increased. It’s not $1,850.10; it’s $5,910.10!

                                                                          David Roberts, Partner

 Here is the Transcript: 7 15 10 TRANSCRIPT. David Roberts, Partner

I’ll analyze the key parts in detail below to demonstrate how biased, and incompetent this judge was, is, and will continue to be:

David Roberts’ $1,850.15 Reward Tainted Judge Koetter’s 7/15/10 Hearing

1. 34-day wrongful imprisonment without access to legal files

2. Release on personal bond 5 days before the hearing violated due process and equal protection rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.    Released on Saturday 7/10/10 — hearing on Thursday 7/15/10.

3. Judge John D. Rainey, his Case Manager Joyce Richards, Anita L. Koop, Terry J. Cox  evaded the Subpoenas without appearing in court.

4. Notices of Lis Pendens: See The Nature and Functions of a Notice of Lis Pendens Posted on October 4, 2012 & AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING Posted on April 17, 2012.

5. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction: See MOTION TO VACATE THE ORDER FOR ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION Posted on September 13, 2012CASES WHERE JUDGE SKIPPER KOETTER LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION RESULTING IN VOID ORDERS/JUDGMENTS Posted on September 30, 2012; MOTION TO VACATE JUDGE SKIPPER KOETTER’S VOID ORDERS/FINAL JUDGMENTS IN 5 CASES Posted on September 25, 2012.

6. David Roberts committed perjury under oath by stating that his law firm had a 10-year policy of destroying clients’ files: Excerpted from Complaint #2 in CIVIL ACTION V-06-78 filed on 3/14/06 available at PACER (E-mail correspondence with Roberts preserved for jury trial.) See Civil Action: 6:05-mc-00002   03/14/2006 AMENDED PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT # 2 Posted on April 16, 2012:

Count 26: The concealment or destruction of documents relating to the property or affairs of the debtor. — 18 U.S.C. §152(8)

4. Chen’s former real estate attorney David Roberts, Esq. & Roberts, Roberts & Odefey, LLP, knowingly and fraudulently concealed, destroyed, or mutilated the recorded information under his custody (including books, legal documents, litigation papers, transaction records, escrow account records, etc.) In spite of his knowledge that such information is indispensable to Chen’s preparation for the COMPLAINTS to be filed at this Court, he first agreed by e-mail

(Fri, Apr 30, 2004 07:13 AM) to retrieve the documents at a cost of $225. Chen’s friend agreed to help pay for the service and contacted Roberts in person, by phone and by e-mail many times in vain. Eventually, Roberts even ignored the phone calls without returning calls or responding to e-mails from either Chen or his friend. Though with a long-term friendly attorney-client relationship, personally Chen holds no grudge against David Roberts, Esq. & Roberts, Roberts & Odefey, LLP, the latter’s recent misconduct made it necessary for Plaintiff to take appropriate actions for self-protection.

5. Who Does the File Belong To?

The primary Texas case regarding access to client files in the absence of litigation between the attorney and client is Resolution Trust Corporation v. H_____, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647 (N. D. Tex. 1989). The opinion does not explicitly say that the entire file belongs to the client, though that is certainly the direction that Judge Sanders’ opinion was headed. The opinion holds that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to the client and, as a result, cannot conceal any file documents from the client, even if there is no current dispute between the attorney and the client. His ruling extends to documents such as attorney notes and memoranda. Note that Rule 76a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure makes some discovery documents “court records” which neither the attorney nor the client can destroy. Disciplinary Rule 1.15(d) provides that an attorney “may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law only if such retention will not prejudice the client in the subject matter of the representation.” (Emphasis added). The primary circumstance in which “other law” permits an attorney to retain the file is when the client has not paid for legal services and the attorney asserts a lien on the file.

In some cases, prejudice to the client from the attorney’s retention of the file will be apparent. For example, if the client is getting new counsel in the case and the file is needed to prepare adequately for a hearing scheduled in a matter of days, prejudice is likely. In general, prejudice to the client is arguable in many situations if the case is still active in some manner or actions can be taken to change the effects of the work of the attorney. Suppose, however, that the case is over, the client lost, and all appeal deadlines are over. Does it “prejudice the client in the subject matter of the representation” not to have the file to give to a new attorney so he can determine if you committed malpractice? The safest course of action is to make the file available to the client in some way. Otherwise, part of the factual presentation in the malpractice suit will be a recitation of how the attorney attempted to cover up his mistake by retaining the “client’s” file.

Under the Resolution Trust Corporation v. H_____, P.C case, the attorney is required to turnover the file to the client without having the client pay for copies. The attorney is permitted, however, to copy anything he or she may want at his or her own expense.

In light of the above case law, Roberts is required to turnover the files to Chen without having Chen pay for copies. Consequently, the fact that Roberts demanded that Chen pay $225 for making copies and Chen acquire the machine for document retrieval at a cost of $40,000 was tantamount to extortion.

Roberts is also responsible for ineffective representation in connection with identifying Cox’s agency for Anita’s.

Plaintiff specifically demands judgment against Roberts for breach of fiduciary duty and ineffective representation in defending the wrongful foreclosure and fraudulent deficiency judgment;

In Causes Nos. 10-6-28, 10-6-29 & 12-4-1596, Judge Koetter rendered VOID Orders/Judgments without any jurisdiction or inconsistent with due process of law. Consequently, all those Orders/Judgments are VOID ab initio. They may be vacated with litigants’ motions or the court can and must set them aside sua sponte.

Chen contends that due process was not accorded him and other interested parties in Causes Nos. 10-6-28, 10-6-29 & 12-4-1596. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction failed in these Koetter courts because of the following specific reasons: Judge Koetter (1) did not follow statutory procedure without requiring Plaintiffs to prove existence of subject matter jurisdiction when Chen challenged the court’s lack of it, See Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill 140, 143 (1921) (If a court’s decision is plainly contrary to a statute or the constitution, the court will be held to have acted without power or jurisdiction, making the judgment void), See, e.g., United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995); 2) did not act impartially and did not even have any appearance of impartiality (See transcripts), See Bracey V Warden, U.S. Supreme Court No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997); (3) violated due process in holding the July 15, 2010 hearing by ambush (lack of pretrial discovery thwarted justice, & allowing Chen only 4 days to prepare for the hearing in the absence of the subpoenaed witnesses: Judge John D. Rainey, his case manager Ms. Joyce Richards, Terry J. Cox and Anita L. Koop, who all evaded the subpoena services) and rendering the July 15, 2010 Judgment in conspiracy with Plaintiffs David Roberts, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP, et al. as well as the November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment for Anita’s Resort Properties., Inc. which has had no standing since 6.5.1993, See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019(193 ; Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill. 2d 241, 245, 140 N.E. 2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936); (4) committed fraud upon the court by acting in manner inconsistent with due process of law and acting unconstitutionally in entering the purported orders and final judgments, See In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill, App. 3d 393(1962); (5) exceeded his statutory authority by labeling Chen “a vexatious litigant” and his lawsuits “frivolous” in the November 30, 2010 Summary Judgment without affording Chen an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way in contravention of the Texas Open Courts Doctrine, See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); (6) committed fraud in the procurement of jurisdiction in conspiracy with Plaintiffs Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., David Roberts, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP, et al., See Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 486 N.E. 2d 893 (1985); (7) immediately after the July 15, 2010 hearing, signed the purported Judicial Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusion prepared in advance by Plaintiffs’ three seasoned attorneys without changing a single word, without taking a glance at Chen’s pleadings filed in the record, and by giving away his bias, prejudice, discrimination, partiality and favoritism with his unspoken, unwritten, unconcealed, undisguised body language; (8) engaged in unlawful activity, particularly accepting two payments totalling $1,850.10 from one of the Plaintiffs, David Roberts, and his law firm, Roberts, Roberts, Odefey & Witte, LLP, in August, 2010 after the July 15, 2010 hearing, See Code of Judicial Conduct; (9) unlawfully denied Chen’s 1st Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances and violated TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE by willfully, erroneously, and maliciously labeling him “a vexatious litigant”, charging him with filing “frivolous” lawsuits and prohibiting him from filing any new petitions in the State of Texas, among others; (10) misinterpreting NOTICES OF LIS PENDEN. See AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING Posted on April 17, 2012“Absolute Privilege of Filing Notices of Lis Pendens v. Texas Penal Code – Section 32.49. Refusal To Execute Release Of Fraudulent Lien Or Claim” Posted on October 5, 2012; The Nature and Functions of a Notice of Lis Pendens Posted on October 4, 2012Offenses Against Public Administration, Bribery and Corrupt Influence, Perjury and Other Falsification Committed by David Roberts, Anita L. Koop, Terry J. Cox, et al. in Conspiracy with Judge Skipper Koetter in the Judicial Proceedings; Posted on December 21, 2012; RANDY HILL COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH JUDGE SKIPPER KOETTER, ANITA L. KOOP + TEXAS GANG Posted on May 17, 2013.

Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Any Order or Judgment Rendered by Judge Koetter Was VOID ab initio!

It can be attacked at any time in any proceedings!

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

* My apologies! I was wrong!

Please click JUDGE JUERGEN (SKIPPER) KOETTER: My readers were wrong! So was I! Posted on  to see why!

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Judge Kemper Stephen Williams Had No Jurisdiction Anyway!

Despite its lack of standing, let’s assume that the Assumed Name Certificate of Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI) was renewed on June 6, 1993, and ARPI had standing on June 20, 1997, would Judge Kemper Stephen Williams have had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Cause No. 96-8-13090?

The answer is NO. Why? Because

Judge Williams Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Either Scenario! 

1. Neither Trustee’s appraisal nor formal abandonment in the entire record of Cause No. 96-24925-VS-7 was shown in accordance with UNIFORM LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE S7-1. Thus, THE ORDER ON ANITA’S RESORT PROPERTIES, INC.’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY dated April 11, 1997 was void ab initio for non-compliance with RULE S7-1(a)(b)(c)(d), 11 U.S.C. Sections 362(a), 554(a)(b), Financial Institution’s Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 51.002, 51.003 (Vernon 1995), Rule 6007 of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, among others.

2. RULE S7-1. PROCEDURE FOR ABANDONMENT OF PROPERTY AND FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS OF 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 IN CHAPTER 7 CASES.

RULE S7-1 specifically provides:

(a) Abandonment by Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(a). 

(b) Relief From the Automatic Stay Provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a), Coupled With a Request for Abandonment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b). 

(c) Agreed Orders. 

(d) Dissemination of Order After Entry.

(a) Abandonment by Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(a).

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(a), a trustee in a chapter 7 case may abandon any property of the estate on the trustee’s own initiative. Prior to abandoning any property, the trustee shall first determine that the property is burdensome to the estate or that the property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.

Any time a trustee abandons property, the notice of abandonment shall be in writing, and shall be filed with the clerk of the court. A copy of the notice shall be served on the U.S. trustee, the debtor(s) and the attorney for debtor(s). Pursuant to Rule 6007, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the notice shall be limited to these parties unless otherwise ordered by the court. The trustee shall file a certificate of service attached to the notice of abandonment with the clerk of the court naming the parties served and the date of service.

Pursuant to Rule 6007, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a notice of abandonment shall inform the parties that any objection to the abandonment must be filed in the office of the clerk within fifteen days from the date of the notice, and such objection must be served on the parties entitled to notice of the abandonment. If an objection is filed, the matter will be scheduled for hearing. If no objection is filed, the abandonment will be deemed to have been made by the trustee with the court’s approval.

(b) Relief From the Automatic Stay Provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a), Coupled With a Request for Abandonment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b).

Abandonment does not correspondingly provide relief from or modification of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a). Relief from the automatic stay must be obtained pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(d) prior to any action being instituted against any property protected by the automatic stay. If relief from the automatic stay is to be obtained in a chapter 7 case, a creditor or party in interest must file a motion with the clerk of the court. If the trustee has not previously abandoned the property from the estate voluntarily, the motion seeking relief from the automatic stay should also request that the court order the trustee to abandon the property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b). The debtor(s) and the trustee should be named as respondents. A copy of the motion must be served on each respondent along with the attorney for the debtor(s) and the U.S. trustee. A certificate of service shall be attached to the motion specifying the parties served and the date of service. A hearing will then be scheduled by the clerk of the court for consideration of the motion.

When a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay is filed, coupled with a request to have the trustee abandon the property from the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b), the moving party shall include in the motion and/or attach to the motion the following:

(1) A description of the subject property;

(2) A complete and legible copy of the movant’s security agreements and security instruments which establish a valid lien encumbering the subject property;

(3) The value of the subject property and the basis of the valuation; and

(4) The amount of the outstanding indebtedness secured by each lien encumbering the subject property as reflected by the schedules of the debtor(s) or such other amount as may be known by the movant.

(c) Agreed Orders.

If the moving creditor, the debtor(s) and the trustee agree as to the relief to be granted, i.e., relief from the automatic stay as well as abandonment, then an agreed order signed by the debtor(s) or the attorney for the debtor(s), the trustee and the moving creditor may be submitted to the court for consideration.

(d) Dissemination of Order After Entry.

If an order is entered by the court lifting the automatic stay as to real property and/or abandoning real property from the bankruptcy estate, the moving creditor shall mail copies of said order, within ten days of the date of its entry by the court, to any other creditors having a lien on said real property as reflected in the schedules filed by the debtor(s).

3. (3B Bankr. Service L.Ed. § 36:258 ["Trustee's abandonment of property of bankruptcy estate eliminates protection of automatic stay provisions of 11 USCA § 362(a) as to estate's interest in property.] Without formal abandonment, the estate retains all of the right, title, and interest in the properties as of date bankruptcy petition was filed.

4. The trustee had never expressed his intention to abandon the properties that ARPI held security interests, having never determined that they were burdensome or of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §554(a) (West 1993).

5. The above violations deprived Defendant ARPI of the right to litigate in the 96-8-13090 court because the secured properties remained assets of the bankruptcy estate, absent Trustee’s appraisals pursuant to Financial Institution’s Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 51.002, 51.003 (Vernon 1995) and formal abandonment under Rule 6007.

6. By rendering the summary judgment on June 20, 1997, Judge Kemper Stephen Williams assumed to have exercised judicial power not granted by law cited above.

7. The June 20, 1997 Judgment was void ab initio in that the 96-8-13090 court had no subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case either because ARPI violated UNIFORM LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE S7-1 or it had in fact no standing without a valid ASSUMED NAME CERTIFICATE in violation of Sec. 71.201 of the BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE.

8. Furthermore, the June 10, 1997 Agreement specifies: Mr. Cain, Chen’s counsel, by this agreement, wants to make it clear that he is not agreeing to the merits of the motion for summary judgment, nor by this agreement, to the entry of the summary judgment. In spite of the clear objection raised by Mr. Cain, Judge Williams rendered the Summary Judgment on June 20, 1997 in conspiracy with Cox/Koop/ARPI and their attorneys Chapman and George in deprivation of Chen’s due process and equal protection rights to have a full and fair hearing.

9. The standard of review for a traditional summary judgment is well established: (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in the nonmovant’s favor. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985). Mr. Cain’s objection to the merits of the motion for summary judgment, and to the entry of the summary judgment  showed that (1) genuine issue of material fact existed and that the Movant is therefore NOT entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant/Chen will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant/Chen and any doubts resolved in the nonmovant/Chen’s favor.

10. When reviewing a summary judgment, we must examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824-25 (Tex. 2005). Here, the Judgment granting ARPI’s motion for summary judgment without  examining the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant/Chen,  indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion constituted violations of the above well-established principles.

11. The 96-8-13090 Court had no power to pass on the merits — had no jurisdiction to have rendered the judgment. It acted without jurisdiction, and the summary judgment rendered on June 20, 1997 is of no force and effect.

12. The VOID June 20, 1997 summary judgment rendered by Judge Williams had a great impact on ARPI’s Wrongful Foreclosure, Fraudulent Deficiency Judgment, False Proofs of Claims, Sheriff’s Unlawful Auctions, Anita Koop’s Illegal Possession of the Auctioned Assets and Purchasers’ Invalid Property Rights, Unlawful Control and Dominion of Wrongfully Auctioned Properties and other Unjust Enrichment Schemes to Chen’s detriment. Click to know more about this judge’s constitutional and statutory violations: Judge Kemper Stephen Williams Had No Jurisdiction Anyway! Posted on .

* If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the action. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai’i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994). Thus, “[i]f a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a proceeding, any judgment rendered in that proceeding is invalid.” Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 76 Hawai’i 128, 133, 870 P.2d 1272, 1277 (1994).

Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Any Order or Judgment Rendered by Judge Williams Was VOID ab initioIt can be attacked at any time in any proceedings!

Under the Supreme Law of the Land, whenever a judge acts when the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is engaged in an act of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449U.S.200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19U.S.(6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821). See Juergen “Skipper” Koetter: U.S. v. Will says you are engaged in an act of treason! May I call you traitor, then? July 22, 2014. If Koetter is a traitor, you will be in the same be wearing the same hat! And the handcuffs will be ready for you, too! 

Mr. Williams has a hat similar to Mr. Koetter’s, too !

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

 

 

Posted in FRAUD ON THE COURT | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

If ARPI had standing, would Judge Williams have Subject Matter Jurisdiction?

Assuming the Assumed Name Certificate of Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI) was renewed on June 6, 1993, and it had standing on June 20, 1997, would Judge Kemper Stephen Williams have had subject matter jurisdiction to hear Cause No. 96-8-13090?

The answer is NO. Why?

Judge Williams Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Anyway! 

1. No Trustee’s appraisal and formal abandonment were shown in accordance with UNIFORM LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE S7-1. Thus, THE ORDER ON ANITA’S RESORT PROPERTIES, INC.’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY dated April 11, 1997 was void ab initio for non-compliance with RULE S7-1(a)(b)(c)(d), 11 U.S.C. Sections 362(a), 554(a)(b), Financial Institution’s Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 51.002, 51.003 (Vernon 1995), Rule 6007 of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, among others.

2. RULE S7-1. PROCEDURE FOR ABANDONMENT OF PROPERTY AND FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS OF 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362 IN CHAPTER 7 CASES

(a) Abandonment by Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(a). 

(b) Relief From the Automatic Stay Provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a), Coupled With a Request for Abandonment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b). 

(c) Agreed Orders. 

(d) Dissemination of Order After Entry.

(a) Abandonment by Trustee Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(a).

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(a), a trustee in a chapter 7 case may abandon any property of the estate on the trustee’s own initiative. Prior to abandoning any property, the trustee shall first determine that the property is burdensome to the estate or that the property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.

Any time a trustee abandons property, the notice of abandonment shall be in writing, and shall be filed with the clerk of the court. A copy of the notice shall be served on the U.S. trustee, the debtor(s) and the attorney for debtor(s). Pursuant to Rule 6007, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the notice shall be limited to these parties unless otherwise ordered by the court. The trustee shall file a certificate of service attached to the notice of abandonment with the clerk of the court naming the parties served and the date of service.

Pursuant to Rule 6007, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a notice of abandonment shall inform the parties that any objection to the abandonment must be filed in the office of the clerk within fifteen days from the date of the notice, and such objection must be served on the parties entitled to notice of the abandonment. If an objection is filed, the matter will be scheduled for hearing. If no objection is filed, the abandonment will be deemed to have been made by the trustee with the court’s approval.

(b) Relief From the Automatic Stay Provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a), Coupled With a Request for Abandonment Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b).

Abandonment does not correspondingly provide relief from or modification of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a). Relief from the automatic stay must be obtained pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(d) prior to any action being instituted against any property protected by the automatic stay. If relief from the automatic stay is to be obtained in a chapter 7 case, a creditor or party in interest must file a motion with the clerk of the court. If the trustee has not previously abandoned the property from the estate voluntarily, the motion seeking relief from the automatic stay should also request that the court order the trustee to abandon the property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b). The debtor(s) and the trustee should be named as respondents. A copy of the motion must be served on each respondent along with the attorney for the debtor(s) and the U.S. trustee. A certificate of service shall be attached to the motion specifying the parties served and the date of service. A hearing will then be scheduled by the clerk of the court for consideration of the motion.

When a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay is filed, coupled with a request to have the trustee abandon the property from the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b), the moving party shall include in the motion and/or attach to the motion the following:

(1) A description of the subject property;

(2) A complete and legible copy of the movant’s security agreements and security instruments which establish a valid lien encumbering the subject property;

(3) The value of the subject property and the basis of the valuation; and

(4) The amount of the outstanding indebtedness secured by each lien encumbering the subject property as reflected by the schedules of the debtor(s) or such other amount as may be known by the movant.

(c) Agreed Orders.

If the moving creditor, the debtor(s) and the trustee agree as to the relief to be granted, i.e., relief from the automatic stay as well as abandonment, then an agreed order signed by the debtor(s) or the attorney for the debtor(s), the trustee and the moving creditor may be submitted to the court for consideration.

(d) Dissemination of Order After Entry.

If an order is entered by the court lifting the automatic stay as to real property and/or abandoning real property from the bankruptcy estate, the moving creditor shall mail copies of said order, within ten days of the date of its entry by the court, to any other creditors having a lien on said real property as reflected in the schedules filed by the debtor(s).

3. (3B Bankr. Service L.Ed. § 36:258 ["Trustee's abandonment of property of bankruptcy estate eliminates protection of automatic stay provisions of 11 USCA § 362(a) as to estate's interest in property.] Without formal abandonment, the estate retains all of the right, title, and interest in the properties as of date bankruptcy petition was filed.

4. The trustee had never expressed his intention to abandon the properties that ARPI held security interests, having never determined that they were burdensome or of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate. See 11 U.S.C. §554(a) (West 1993).

5. The above violations deprived Defendant ARPI of the right to litigate in the 96-8-13090 court because the secured properties remained assets of the bankruptcy estate, absent Trustee’s appraisals pursuant to Financial Institution’s Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 51.002, 51.003 (Vernon 1995) and formal abandonment under Rule 6007.

6. By rendering the summary judgment on June 20, 1997, Judge Kemper Stephen Williams assumed to have exercised judicial power not granted by law cited above.

7. The June 20, 1997 Judgment was void ab initio in that the 96-8-13090 court had no subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case either because ARPI violated UNIFORM LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE S7-1 or it had in fact no standing without a valid ASSUMED NAME CERTIFICATE in violation of Sec. 71.201 of the BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE.

8. Furthermore, the June 10, 1997 Agreement specifies: Mr. Cain, Chen’s counsel, by this agreement, wants to make it clear that he is not agreeing to the merits of the motion for summary judgment, nor by this agreement, to the entry of the summary judgment. In spite of the clear objection raised by Mr. Cain, Judge Williams rendered the Summary Judgment on June 20, 1997 in conspiracy with Cox/Koop/ARPI and their attorneys Chapman and George in deprivation of Chen’s due process and equal protection rights to have a full and fair hearing.

9. The standard of review for a traditional summary judgment is well established: (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3)
every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in the nonmovant’s favor. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985). Mr. Cain’s objection to the merits of the motion for summary judgment, and to the entry of the summary judgment  showed that (1) genuine issue of material fact existed and that the Movant is therefore NOT entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant/Chen will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant/Chen and any doubts resolved in the nonmovant/Chen’s favor.

10. When reviewing a summary judgment, we must examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824-25 (Tex. 2005). Here, the Judgment granting ARPI’s motion for summary judgment without  examining the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant/Chen,  indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion constituted violations of the above well-established principles.

11. The 96-8-13090 Court had no power to pass on the merits — had no jurisdiction to have rendered the judgment. It acted without jurisdiction, and the summary judgment rendered on June 20, 1997 is of no force and effect.

12. The VOID June 20, 1997 summary judgment rendered by Judge Williams had a great impact on ARPI’s Wrongful Foreclosure, Fraudulent Deficiency Judgment, False Proofs of Claims, Sheriff’s Unlawful Auctions, Anita Koop’s Illegal Possession of the Auctioned Assets and Purchasers’ Invalid Property Rights, Unlawful Control and Dominion of Wrongfully Auctioned Properties and other Unjust Enrichment Schemes to Chen’s detriment.

 

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

E-mail Addresses:

ricofraudonthecourt@yahoo.com

pc886405@yahoo.com

Posted in FRAUD ON THE COURT | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

WHY JUDGE KEMPER STEPHEN WILLIAMS WAS/IS MERELY ONE OF THE RACKETEERS, TOO.

Mayor Will Armstrong meets with Police Chief Bruce Ure prior to entering the Victoria County Courthouse on Thursday.  Judge Stephen Williams dismissed the charges against Ure at a hearing that was re-scheduled today.

“I require three things in a man. He must be handsome, ruthless and stupid.” —
Dorothy Parker (American short-story Writer and Poet, 1893-1967)

You look handsome, Mr. Williams, but do you have the other two attributes, i.e., ruthlessness and stupidity, Dorothy requires?

Does racketeering qualify for ruthlessness?

Does rendering VOID Orders/Judgments without jurisdiction, power or authority qualify for ruthlessness or stupidity or both?

SKIPPER KOETTER IS MERELY ONE OF THE RACKETEERS; SO IS JUDGE WILLIAMS! Posted on September 25, 2013. In this post, I had no time to cover the wrongs inflicted on me by Judge Williams. Here are the reasons why I sued him in his personal and official capacities together with the other conspirators/racketeers:

Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. had no standing.

The 96-8-13090 Court had no Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

1. Judge Kemper Stephen Williams rendered a VOID Judgment in Cause No. 96-8-13090 for Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. without subject matter jurisdiction on June 20, 1997. The Judgment was procured by committing fraud on the court by Anita L. Koop, Terry J. Cox, Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., and their attorneys, Richard T. Chapman & Thomas George.

2. On March 30, 2011, Chen became aware of the non-entity status of Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. through Texas Secretary of State’s Office.  Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI) has had neither factual nor legal existence since June 6, 1993 when its ASSUMED NAME CERTIFICATE expired upon its 10th anniversary, i.e., June 5, 1993. See PR1 ASSUMED NAME CERTIFICATE OF Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. Expired on 6/5/93.

3. Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., having lost its corporate status on June 5, 1993 without renewing its Assumed Name Certificate, had no standing (See AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1-23) when it initiated the deficiency judgment proceedings, and Judge Williams had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and enter any Order or Judgment. Thus, the June 20, 1997 Order/Judgment was VOID ab initio. It must be set aside in that “All courts have a duty to vacate void orders.” Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (1974). See SECOND WARNING TO SUNILANDINGS LOT/HOME OWNERS: THE WARRANTY DEEDS ISSUED BY ANITA’S REORT PROEPRTIES, INC. ARE FRAUDULENT, INVALID AND WORTHLESS! Posted on October 29, 2012.

4. The June 14, 2012 Letter by Judge Williams to District Clerk Ms. Hartgrove is quoted in pertinent part as follows: “Re: Paul Chen, Pro Se vs. Rick Perry, et. al. I’ve been provided a copy of the above petition and I’ve reviewed Judge Koetter’s Orders in Cause No. 10-6-28. Pursuant to Sec. 11.102, Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, you are ordered to not file the above petition unless and until I, as local administrative judge, grant permission for the petition to be filed.” See AMENDED Cover Letter + PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 Posted on May 23, 2013; Skipper Koetter, you don’t even know what “vexatious” and “frivolous” mean! Posted on May 17, 2013; Can you conscientiously think of me as “a vexatious litigant”, and my causes of action as “frivolous”? Posted on September 30, 2012; and AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION Posted on May 13, 2013 (See The following 61 paragraphs focus on challenging Judge Koetter’s erroneous ruling labeling Chen a vexatious litigant filing frivolous lawsuits.).

5. In light of the above grounds, this Letter Order is in violation of Chen’s First Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances, the Texas open courts doctrine, and TRCP Rule 145, amended, signed, and entered by Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson and other Justices of the Texas Supreme Court on 9/19/2005. Rule 145 provides in pertinent part: “Upon the filing of the affidavit, the clerk must docket the action, issue citation and provide such other customary services as are provided any party.” Chen filed multiple Affidavits of Indigency, but the Clerk failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 145. The June 14, 2012 Letter Order by Judge Williams is to blame!

6. The restrictions imposed on Chen by Judge Williams are unreasonable and arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statutes. Furthermore, having been named as one of the Defendants in various causes of action in the federal and state courts, including the PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 that he unlawfully intercepted to benefit himself, Judge Williams should have recused/disqualified himself instead of illegally stopping Chen from exercising his constitutional and statutory rights.

7. Chen’s well-pled, well-recognized common law and civil rights causes of action have been unreasonably, arbitrarily, and repeatedly restricted by the VOID Orders/Judgments rendered by Judges Williams and Koetter in various cases.

VOID Orders/Judgments

8. A judgment is void when the court does not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or “lacks the inherent power to enter the order involved.” Petersen, 16 Wash. App. at 79 (citing Bresolin, 86 Wash. 2d at 245; Anderson, 52 Wash. 2d at 761) (additional citation omitted).

9. Irrespective of whether a party moves to vacate a judgment, the courts have inherent authority to vacate a void judgment. Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68.

10. All courts have a duty to vacate void orders. Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (1974) (“A void judgment is a legal nullity and a court considering a motion to vacate has no discretion in determining whether it should be set aside.” 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice, 60.25.”).

Order/Judgment Obtained by Fraud upon the Court is VOID ab initio.

11. “Fraud upon the court” has been defined as that fraud committed by an officer of the court in any attempt to deceive, either by commission, by omission, by speech, by silence, by gesture, by innuendo, by look, etc. Whenever this fraud is committed in a court of law by any attorney or judge, it is a “fraud upon the court”. In re Eugene Lee Armentrout et al., Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983); Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858 (1977); In re Lamberis, 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549 (1982); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (1985); Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (1948).

12. Fraud upon the court by an attorney, whether or not intrinsic or extrinsic, can be used to set aside a prior judgment. Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 79 S.E.2d 605 (2003) 37. We have the inherent power to vacate the judgment of the Court, fashion an appropriate remedy, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991); Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 250; Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001), and sanction a party or its lawyers for willful abuse of the judicial process, particularly when the party or its lawyers have intentionally practiced a fraud upon the court. Levander, 180 F.3d at 1119; see also Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2001).

13. Courts possess the inherent power to vacate or amend a judgment obtained by fraud on the court, Toscano v. CIR, 441 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1971), but that power is narrowly construed, applying only to fraud that defiles the court or is perpetrated by officers of the court. When we conclude that the integrity of the judicial process has been harmed, however, and the fraud rises to the level of “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decisions,” we not only can act, we should. England v. J Doyle, 281 F.2d at 309; Levander v. Prober, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Intermagnetics Am., Inc. v. China Int’l Trust and Inv. Corp., 926 F.2d 912, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1991).

14. “… Where a lawyer engages in a conspiracy to commit a fraud upon the court by the production of fabricated evidence and by such means obtains a judgement then the enforcement of the judgement becomes manifestly unconscionable’ and a court of equity may devitalize the judgement.” See Sutter v. Easterly (Mo) 189 SW2d 288. Id, at 288. (“His scheme and conspiracy were such a violation of a lawyer’s duty to the court — a duty imposed not alone by the principles of honesty and good morals but also by a code of ethics adopted as rules of court, as to amount to a fraud on the court for which equity will grant relief.”)

A Judgment Entered Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Void.

15. If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void. Pifer v. Pifer, 31 N.C. App. 486, 229 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1976).

16. A judgment entered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992). Also, it is the longstanding rule that such a void judgment may be attacked at any time in any proceeding. Id. ; Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988); Lammers Land & Cattle Co. v. Hans, 213 Neb. 243, 328 N.W.2d 759 (1983) . It may be impeached in any action, direct or collateral. Marshall v. Marshall. Stanton v. Stanton, 146 Neb. 71, 18 N.W.2d 654 (1945); Hassett v. Durbin, 132 Neb. 315, 271 N.W. 867 (1937). See, also, Shade v. Kirk, 227 Neb. 775, 420 N.W.2d 284 (1988). That is because a void judgment is in reality no judgment at all. Marshall v. Marshall.

17. This court has further held that when a void judgment is entered it can be attacked at any time, directly or collaterally, whenever the question is raised. (Citation omitted). The rule therefore is that due diligence is not a necessary fact to be proven when it is alleged and proved that the petitioner’s constitutional rights have been violated. It was not necessary for appellees to prove that due diligence was used in filing their petitions. 07/30/86 DANNY J. RAY v. STATE INDIANA 496 N.E.2d 93.

18. It has long been established as basic law that the validity of a judgment depends upon the court’s jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter of the particular issue it assumes to decide. Considering what is meant by the term “jurisdiction” it is well settled that this term includes the court’s power to enter the judgment, and the entry of a decree which the court has no authority to enter is without jurisdiction and void. A void judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally. Newman v. Bullock, 23 Colo. 217, 47 Pac. 379; Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 95 Colo. 435, 37 P (2d).

19. “A void judgment lacks validity anywhere and is subject to attack from any angle.” State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Sandefur, 215 Tenn. 690, 701, 389 S.W.2d 266, 271 (1965); Acuff v. Daniel, 215 Tenn. 520, 525, 387 S.W.2d 796, 798 (1965).

20. Any interested party may move to set aside a void judgment. High v. Southwestern Insurance Co., Okl., 520 P.2d 662 (1974). A different statutory rule applies when the judgment sought to be vacated is alleged to be void. Under the provisions of 12 O.S. 1971 § 1038 any party affected by a void judgment has an independent claim for vacation. It may seek vacation at any time. Jent v. Brown, Okl., 280 P.2d 1005, 1008 [1955].

A Judgment Violating a Citizen’s Right to Due Process is Void.

21. Textile Banking Company, Inc. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 1981) (“If the underlying judgment is void because the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or because the entry of the order violated the due process rights of the respondent, the trial judge has no discretion and must grant appropriate Rule 60(b) relief.”).

22. A judgment issued from a proceeding that violates a citizen’s right to due process is void. State v. Rehbein, 235 Neb. 536, 455 N.W.2d 821 (1990); State v. Von Dorn, 234 Neb. 93, 449 N.W.2d 530 (1989); State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d 609 (1975); In re Application of Maher, North v. Dorrance, 144 Neb. 484, 13 N.W.2d 653 (1944); In re Betts, 36 Neb. 282, 54 N.W. 524 (1893). A void judgment may be set aside at any time and in any proceeding. VonSeggern v. Willman, 244 Neb. 565, 508 N.W.2d 261 (1993); Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992); State v. Ewert,; Ehlers v. Grove, 147 Neb. 704, 24 N.W.2d 866 (1946); Hayes County v. Wileman, 82 Neb. 669, 118 N.W. 478 (1908). ‘A void judgment may be attacked at any time in any proceeding.’” Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 328, 482 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1992).

23. There has been a denial of due process and the judgment is void. Plaintiff, however, contends that defendant has failed to show a meritorious defense. But since the judgment was void, defendant did not have to show a meritorious defense. 7 Moore, Federal Practice, § 60.25(2) at 264 (2d ed.). See the following cases in which a void judgment was ordered vacated upon motion without any discussion of the question whether a meritorious defense was shown: Shilhan v. Ho, 40 Haw. 302; Gouveia v. Nakamura, 13 Haw. 450; Phoenix Metals Corp. v. Roth, supra, 79 Ariz. 106, 284 P.2d 645. In Wise v. Herzog, 114 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.) it was held that a meritorious defense need not be shown when the attack on the void judgment was by motion in the original suit. To the same effect are Schwarz v. Thomas, 222 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.) and Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410 (8th Cir.). Cf., Perkins v. Sykes, supra.

24.  “A void judgment lacks validity anywhere and is subject to attack from any angle.” State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Sandefur, 215 Tenn. 690, 701, 389 S.W.2d 266, 271 (1965); Acuff v. Daniel, 215 Tenn. 520, 525, 387 S.W.2d 796, 798 (1965).

25. This Court had no authority to make a finding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. The People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) (“If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, – it had no authority to make that finding.”).

26. The 96-8-13090 Court’s allegation that it has subject-matter jurisdiction was not supported by the record of the case. The court acted without jurisdiction.

The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Rests upon Plaintiffs.

27. When subject-matter is denied, the party who claims that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction has the burden to prove that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Bindell v. City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) (“the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it.”); Loos v. American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841 (1988) (“Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff.”).

28. When subject-matter jurisdiction is denied, it becomes the responsibility of the party claiming that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to prove that the court holds subject-matter jurisdiction. Bindell v. City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) (“the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it.”); Ballard v. Fred E. Rawlins, M.D., Inc., 101 Ill.App.601, 428 N.E.2d 532 (1981) (“Where jurisdiction is denied by the defendant, the burden of proving its presence rests upon the party asserting it.”).

29. The 96-8-13090 Court is not a party to the proceeding and therefore has no lawful authority to assert or prove that it has subject-matter jurisdiction.

Any Proceedings Founded upon a Void Judgment are Equally Worthless.

30. A void judgment is a mere nullity, and any proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. See Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 17, 154 N.W. 701, 703 (1916); Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis.2d 85, 99, 368 N.W.2d 648, 656 (1985). A void judgment cannot create a right or obligation, as it is not binding on anyone. See id.

31. Defendant’s argument is supported by the general rule that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Le Clair v. Calls Him, 106 Okl. 247, 233 P. 1087 (1925). “A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are necessarily equally worthless, and have no effect whatever upon the parties or matters in question. A void judgment neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are absolutely void. The parties attempting to enforce it are trespassers.” High v. Southwestern Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974).

32.  The general rule is that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Where judgments are void, as was the judgment originally rendered by the trial court here, any subsequent proceedings based upon the void judgment are themselves void. In essence, no judgment existed from which the trial court could adopt either findings of fact or conclusions of law. Valley Vista Development Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 766 P.2d 344, 1988 OK 140 (Okla. 12/06/1988).

33. “‘It is a general rule of law that a judgment which is null and void is subject to collateral attack.’ 31 Am. Jur. 181, sec. 583. ‘A void judgment may be impeached in a collateral proceeding.’ 34 C.J. 510.” Drainage District No. 1 v. Village of Hershey, 139 Neb. 205, 211, 296 N.W. 879, 882 (1941). See, also, Davis Management, Inc. v. Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 276, 204 Neb. 316, 282 N.W.2d 576 (1979); County of Douglas v. Feenan, 146 Neb. 156, 18 N.W.2d 740 (1945).

A Void Judgment is Good Nowhere and Bad Everywhere.

34. A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity. Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). Also, a void judgment has been defined as “one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at anytime and at any place directly or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758). It has also been held that “It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or, collateral.’ Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.).

35. A void judgment implies no judgment at all, and its nonexistence may be declared upon collateral attack, upon suggestion of an amicus curiae, or by the court at any time upon its own motion.” Lowery v. State Life Ins. Co. (1899), 153 Ind. 100, 102, 54 N.E. 442, 443. Generally there is no requirement for one subjected to a “void” judgment to do anything more than call the trial court’s attention to the mistake with a request that the same be corrected pursuant to Trial Rule 59. See State, ex rel. Eggers v. Branaman (1932) 204 Ind. 238, 183 N.E. 653.

A Void Judgment Cannot Constitute Res Judicata.

Res Judicata does not Bar Collateral Attacks on Void Judgment.

36. A void judgment cannot constitute res judicata. Denial of previous motions to vacate a void judgment could not validate the judgment or constitute res judicata, for the reason that the lack of judicial power inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered. Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960).

37. A void judgment amounts to nothing and has no force as res judicata.” Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Coffelt, 301 Ark. 112, 782 S.W.2d 45 (1990).

38. In Halbach v. Halbach, 259 Wis. 329, 331, 48 N.W.2d 617 (1951), the void judgment was challenged ten years after entry. The court stated that laches did not apply even if the plaintiff had been dilatory or lackadaisical in his efforts to overturn the judgment. ” It is the duty of the court to annul an invalid judgment.” A void judgment cannot be validated by consent, ratification, waiver, or estoppel. Furthermore, void judgments may be attacked collaterally.

39. Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1985) (after judgment awarded, defendant paid, then found out this was action in admiralty that should have been brought solely against United States; court held that judgment was void); Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1979) (judgment by default awarded penalty wages under inapplicable statute; court held that judgment was void, not just erroneous); see also V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that judgment can be void if court’s action involves a “plain usurpation of power”); Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1963) (court had no power to impose unconstitutional prior restraint on publication of true statements, so thirty-year-old consent judgment was void).

40. Laches does not operate to preclude the opening or vacating of a void judgment, for the reason that no amount of acquiescence can make it valid. 03/05/51 SLACK v. GRIGSBY 97 N.E.2d 145.

41. Void judgments may be vacated regardless of the lapse of time. In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d 612, 618-19, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989). Consequently, not even the doctrine of laches bars a party from attacking a void judgment. Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d at 619-20.

42. As to an act or omission rendering the judgment void, it is well settled that even though a void judgment is a nullity and may be ignored by those whose rights are attempted to be affected thereby, a court will not permit such a judgment to encumber the record, but will vacate the ineffectual entry thereof on proper application, although the application is made after the term of the rendition of the judgment. Even the lapse of a period of years does not necessarily preclude relief, which is sometimes declared available regardless of what length of time has intervened since the rendition of the judgment. Laches does not operate to preclude the opening or vacating of a void judgment, for the reason that no amount of acquiescence can make it valid. 03/05/51 SLACK v. GRIGSBY 97 N.E.2d 145.

A Void Order may be Attacked at Any Time in Any Proceeding.

43. A court may at any time relieve a party from a void judgment. A judgment entered by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is a void judgment and may be vacated at any time on the court’s own motion or upon the motion of any party thereto, including the party who originally invoked the jurisdiction of the court. Carpenter v Dennison, 208 Mich 441 (1919); Orloff v Morehead Manufacturing Co, 273 Mich 62 (1935); Shane v Hackney, 341 Mich 91 (1954); Millman Brothers, Inc v Detroit, 2 Mich App 161 (1966); Carpenter v Dennison, 208 Mich 441 [175 NW 419] (1919); Banner v Banner, 45 Mich App 148, 153; 206 NW2d 234 (1973).

44. “If the order is void, it may be attacked at any time in any proceeding,” Evans v Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990); “a void judgment, order or decree may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally” Oak Park Nat. Bank v Peoples Gas Light & Coke Col, 46 Ill.App.2d 385, 197 N.E.2d 73, 77 (1st Dist. 1964); “that judgment is void and may be attacked at any time in the same or any other court, by the parties or by any other person who is affected thereby.”. It is also clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court at any time.” People v. Wade, 116 Ill.2d 1, 506 N.E.2d 954 (1987)

45. A collateral proceeding may not generally be used to contradict or impeach a final judgment. La Presto v. La Presto, 285 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. 1955). However, a void judgment “is entitled to no respect, and may be impeached at any time in any proceeding in which it is sought to be enforced or in which its validity is questioned by anyone with whose rights or interests it conflicts.” Id. The reported cases are clear that an attack upon a void judgment is not subject to the “reasonable time” requirements of Rule 74.06. Williams v. Williams, 932 S.W.2d 904, 905-06 (Mo. App. 1996); State ex rel. Houston v. Malen, 864 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Mo. App. 1993) (questioned on other grounds by Brackett v. Laney, 920 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1996)). In Williams, the Eastern District held that a direct attack filed eight years after entry of a void default judgment was timely under Rule 74.06. See Williams, 932 S.W.2d at 905-06. Similarly, in Houston, the appellate court approved of a direct attack upon a judgment filed four years and three months after the judgment was entered. See Houston, 864 S.W.2d at 430.

The Court Has Not Only the Power But the Duty to Vacate a Void Judgment.

46. “The court has not only the power but the duty to vacate the inadvertent entry of a void judgment at any time, either during the term or after the term, with or without a motion therefor[e].” See Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2d 705, at page 707.

47. Where a void judgment has been rendered and the record in the cause, or judgment roll, reflects the vice, then the court has not only the power but the duty and even after the expiration of the term to set aside such judgment. Harrison v. Whiteley, Tex.Com.App., 6 S.W.2d 89.

48. There is no . . . discretion on the part of a court reviewing a void judgment. Schoffstall v. Failey (1979), Ind.App., 389 N.E.2d 361.

49. A trial court has no discretion when faced with a void judgment, and must vacate the judgment “whenever the lack of jurisdiction comes to light.” Mitchell v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990).

The Court Lacked Inherent Power to Render Its Void Judgment.

The Court Only Held Inherent Power to Vacate Its Void Judgment.

50. “A void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally,” People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).

51. The courts through their inherent judicial power, have the authority to do all things reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice, whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not. This holds particularly true in the case of a void judgment. Laschanzky v. Laschanzky, 246 Neb. 705, 523 N.W.2d 29 (1994).

52. In Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt (1966), 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 36, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 42, 45, 215 N.E.2d 698,704, we stated, “A court has an inherent power to vacate a void judgment because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was always a nullity.”

53. A court has an inherent power to vacate a void judgment because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was always a nullity.” The term “inherent power” used in the two preceding cases is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 782 as “[a]n authority possessed without its being derived from another. A right, ability, or faculty of doing a thing, without receiving that right, ability, or faculty from another.” Because this claim challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, it was not barred by res judicata because a void judgment may be challenged at any time. See State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 45-46, 652 N.E.2d 196, 200, fn. 6.

TO BE CONTINUED.

Paul Chen

E-mail Addresses:

ricofraudonthecourt@yahoo.com

pc886405@yahoo.com

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