RANDALL W. HILL’S PERJURY & SUMMARY JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH SKIPPER KOETTER posted at MANDAMUS: VOID Orders/Judgments on October 14, 2014 seemed to have popularized both CONSPIRATORS!
“Who is that man over there? I don’t know him. What is he doing? Is he a conspirator? Have you searched him? Give him till tomorrow to confess, then hang him! — hang him!” — Oscar Wilde quotes (Irish Poet, Novelist, Dramatist and Critic, 1854-1900)
Is this Judge Juergen (Skipper) Koetter?
Is he the judge bribed or rewarded
$1,850.10 $5,900.10 by David Roberts, & Roberts Roberts Odefey Witte LLP before and after the 7/15/2010 hearing?
$1,850.10 to win a lawsuit? Isn’t that quite cheap? Sorry, I was mistaken. It was $5,900.10.
See the new posts: SKIPPER KOETTER IS MERELY ONE OF THE RACKETEERS; SO IS JUDGE WILLIAMS! Posted on September 25, 2013 & TEXAS RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE & CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Posted on October 4, 2013.
“Fraud and falsehood only dread examination. Truth invites it.” — Samuel Johnson quotes (English Poet, Critic and Writer. 1709-1784)
Corrupt judges like John D. Rainey, Janis Graham Jack, S. Thomas Anderson, Skipper Koetter, Kemper Stephen Williams; unethical lawyers like Richard T. Chapman, David Roberts, Randal W. Hill, Jameson B. Carroll, Emily T. Landry, Ron McAfee, Edward Bearman; ignorant/discriminatory ADA Shannon Salyer, Sheriff B.B. Browning & Magistrate Hope Kurtz, crooks and fraudsters like Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and those named and unnamed in my posts: They have seized upon the government by bribery and corruption. They have made speculation and public robbery a science. They have loaded the nation, the state, the county, and the city with debt. — Quotes from Denis Kearney (1847–1907), a late 19th century California labor leader, applied to some Texas’s and Tennessee’s rotten, immoral, despicable OFFICERS OF THE COURT and two major crooks and fraudsters.
Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom.
While teaching, I also worked undercover in the lower courts by saying I was a young law teacher wanting experience in criminal law. The judges were happy to assist me but what I learned was how corrupt the lower courts were. Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom. — Samuel Dash
Samuel Dash (February 27, 1925 – May 29, 2004) was an American professor of law who acted as a co-chief counsel along with Fred Thompson for the Senate Watergate Committee during the Watergate scandal. Dash became famous for his televised interrogations during the hearings held by the United States Congress on the Watergate incident. — From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Ha! Judge Skipper Koetter seems a lot wiser in that he concealed the moneys under the cover of campaign contributions and that he managed not to accept money in the courtroom, I guess. But a reasonable man cannot rule out his accepting money in his chambers, bedchambers, or living room, can he? One of my former attorneys mentioned that the most effective way for money to change hands had been knowingly and willfully losing the chips to the judge in the poker game in a private group. See Judge Skipper Koetter’s Campaign Finance Suspected of Bribery Posted on September 29, 2012.
FINAL ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is VOID ab initio.
Do you know that the non-movant’s failure to respond to the motion in the trial court should not result in a judgment by default, CONSPIRATORS? See Paragraphs 17 through 19 for details. Not to mention that the plaintiffs had no standing and the court had no subject matter jurisdiction.
Do you know that a case like this, dismissal is mandatory, not discretionary?
Not only do you have power but duty to dismiss the case instead of being forced to render another VOID Order to waste judicial resources, Conspirator, Racketeer, Trespasser, Imposter, Traitor? Shall I share with you some case law depicting the traits of these Role Models whom you represent all in one, Private Citizen Koetter? Are you sitting on the bench in the kangaroo court?
A kangaroo court
is “a mock court in which the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted”.
It is essentially where the defendant has already been deemed guilty, a
nd has little if any opportunities to object or defend himself or herself.
1. The “fraud on the court” doctrine rests on two distinct features.
First, as the Tenth Circuit has explained in Robinson v. Audi Aktiengesellschaft, 56 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1045 (1996), “whatever else it embodies, [fraud on the court] requires a showing that one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud the court.”
Second, as the Tenth Circuit explained in Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), the deception must go to the heart of the judicial proceeding, creating an impression about the core, operative facts that is relied on by the court and is false. “Fraud on the court … is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself.”
2. The purported FINAL ORDER is not final; it is VOID ab initio because 1) Plaintiffs have no standing; 2) the Court had no jurisdiction; 3) Randal W. Hill, Plaintiffs’ counsel, committed perjury and fraud on the court in conspiracy with Judge Skipper Koetter, who has been one of the defendants in lawsuits Chen filed in the record; 4) Judge Koetter should have recused himself, but he rendered the ORDER without any power, authority or jurisdiction; and 5) Lacking jurisdiction, private citizen Koetter is guilty of Racketeering, Abuse and Misuse of Judicial Power, Trespassing, Usurpation, Conspiracy, Corruption, and Treason.
Oh, help me, God! I sinned! I lied under oath! I perjured!
I’m demanding to be prosecuted. I’m begging to be prosecuted for perjury. — George Galloway
Mr. Hill & Mr. Roberts: Are you as conscience-stricken as this brother of yours? I believe he is truly remorseful! Are you? Be truthful! “Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” — John 8:32
3. Even if the court had jurisdiction, the purported FINAL ORDER violated the Open Courts Doctrine of Texas Constitution and Chen’s due process and equal protection rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
4. And the purported FINAL ORDER pronounced lacked the three elements of jurisdiction: 1) subject matter; 2) persons/parties; 3) entry of record, not authorized by law, and so was rendered without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution of Texas and that of the United States.
5. Plaintiffs deprived Defendant of his “life, liberty and property” guaranteed by the 14th Amendment without due process of law and denied him the equal protection of the laws. BALLARD V. HUNTER, 204 U.S. 241 (1907)
6. Where a litigant had the benefit of a full and fair trial in the state courts, and his rights are measured, not by laws made to affect him individually, but by general provisions of law applicable to all those in like condition, he is not deprived of property without due process of law, even if he can be regarded as deprived of his property by an adverse result. Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).
7. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884). “Due process of law is [process which], following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.” Id. at 708; Accord, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
8. “[P]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
9. Thus, the required elements of due process are those that “minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations” by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests. The core of these requirements is notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal. Due process may also require an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, and for discovery; that a decision be made based on the record, and that a party be allowed to be represented by counsel. 688 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).
10. The laws or the enforcement of the laws of the State of Texas come under the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment because they infringed fundamental rights.
11. In In re Discount Rental, Inc., the per curiam Court conditionally issued a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate an order that a judgment debtor’s property be sold to satisfy a void judgment. (Com#6)
12. A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea by which a party challenges a court’s authority to determine the subject matter of the action. Bland ISD v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The purpose of a dilatory plea is not to force the plaintiffs to preview their case on the merits but to establish a reason why the merits should never be reached. Id. Prohibition is the proper remedy, where an inferior court assumes to exercise judicial power not granted by law.
13. Attorney Randal W. Hill is guilty of perjury and shall be fined under 18 USC § 1621 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. See VOID ORDERS and Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. The trial court conducted a hearing; agreed that plaintiff had deliberately concealed her pre-existing back condition; and dismissed her suit with prejudice for fraud on the court. The Third DCA affirmed. Here, Attorney Randal W. Hill’s false or misleading statement given under oath concerning issues central to his case amounted to fraud. See Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). He deliberately concealed the fact that Chen sent the Replies to the Clerk by CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED: 7011 1570 0002 7183 on May 7, 2013 and reciprocally sent him the filed documents by e-mail on the same day. See 5 7 13 PAUL CHEN’S COVER LETTER TO CLERK BY CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 7011 1570 0002 7183 0203 & 5 7 13 Paul Chen’s E-mail to Randal W. Hill, Esq. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to render the purported FINAL ORDER procured by fraud on the court based on Mr. HILL’s intentional misrepresentation: “The response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment was first “posted” by Chen on May 13, 2013” and “Prior to submission of the motion, the Plaintiffs lodged their objection to the timeliness and improper service of Defendant Chen’s Response and said objection was granted” was an abuse of discretion and deliberate indifference to Chen’s constitutional rights. See Rosenthal v. Rodriguez, 750 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). See RANDY HILL COMMITTED FRAUD ON THE COURT IN CONSPIRACY WITH JUDGE KIPPER KOETTER, ANITA L. KOOP + TEXAS GANG Posted on May 17, 2013.
Randall W. Hill, the attorney for my opponents, lied under oath, and committed fraud on the court by showing Judge Koetter all the wrong directions except the one highlighted, which is the right way to find the facts to support his legal conclusions.
14. As set forth in Rosenthal v. Rodriguez, 750 So. 2d 703,704 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000): Courts throughout this state have repeatedly held “that a party who has been guilty of fraud or misconduct in the prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding should not be permitted to continue to employ the very institution it has subverted to achieve her ends.” Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen, 736 So. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (quoting Hanono v. Murphy, 723 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also Cox v. Burke, 706 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); O’Vahey v. Miller, 644 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
15. “[T]o justify reversal, it would have to be shown on appeal that the trial
court clearly erred in its interpretation of the facts and the use of its judgment and not merely that the court, or another fact-finder, might have made a different factual determination.” See Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983); Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 82-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
16. Chen asserts that there was clear and convincing evidence that Attorney Randal W. Hill had set into motion an “unconscionable scheme” to interfere with “the judicial system’s ability to impartially adjudicate the matter.” See Jacob v. Henderson, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D286 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan.24, 2003). The record before the court demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of fraud; Chen has unequivocally “shown that the sanction imposed is unreasonable” and that the trial court “clearly erred in its interpretation of the facts and the law.” See Baker v. Myers Tractor Services, Inc., 765 So. 2d 151, (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
The non-movant’s failure to respond to the motion in the trial court should not result in a judgment by default.
Neiher attorney Randall W. Hill nor Judge Skipper Koetter knows about this controlling precedent! Shame on them!
17. When the motion does not present any grounds in support of summary judgment, the non-movant is not required to except to it in the trial court. See McConnell v. Southside Independent School District, 858 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1993); see also Mercantile Ventures, Inc. v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 902 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no writ). The reasoning is that the motion must stand or fall on its own merits, and the non-movant’s failure to respond or except to the motion in the trial court should not result in a judgment by default. See McConnell, 858 S.W.2d at 342.
18. Where the summary judgment motion presents some grounds, but not all, once again the non-movant is not required to except to the trial court because to do so in this situation would require the non-movant to alert the movant to the additional grounds that he left out of his summary judgment motion. See id. See also DeWoody v. Rippley, 951 S.W.2d 935, 944 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ dism’d by agr.).
19. The movant is entitled to file a reply to the non-movant’s response. However, Rule 166a does not set forth any time requirements for filing a movant’s reply based solely upon legal arguments. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166A; Knapp v. Eppright, 783 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 1989, no writ). The movant could file this reply the very day of the hearing on his motion. See Knapp v. Eppright, 783 S.W.2d at 296; Wright v. Lewis, 777 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
20. Based on 17 through 19 above, the rulings: “The response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment was first “posted” by Chen on May 13, 2013” and “Prior to submission of the motion, the Plaintiffs lodged their objection to the timeliness and improper service of Defendant Chen’s Response and said objection was granted” are erroneous in addition to the court’s lack of power, authority, and jurisdiction to hear and decide the case absent the Plaintiffs’ standing.
21. The non-movant must file and serve the response, accompanying evidence or special exceptions or objections to the movant’s no-evidence motion not later than seven days before the hearing. See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. 1993); Crews v. Plainsman Trading Co., 827 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied). The non-movant can file the response on the seventh day before the hearing – there does not have to be seven full days. See Thomas v. Medical Arts Hosp., 920 S.W.2d 815, 817-18 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied); Wright v. Lewis, 777 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); Benger Builders, Inc. v. Business Credit Leasing, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1988, writ denied). Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5, the non-movant can also use the mail to file his response, and if he does, it is considered timely filed on the day it is deposited in the mail so long as it reaches the clerk no more than ten days after it is due. See Geiselman v. Cramer Fin. Group, 965 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ); Clendennen v. Williams, 896 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ). This means Chen could have filed the response, accompanying evidence or special exceptions or objections on 5/9/13 and is still timely. Therefore, having filed them on 5/7/13, Chen has unequivocally defeated the charge of untimeliness by two days.
22. As to the “improper service” charge, it is again the clerk’s duty under Amendment to Rule 145 of T.R.C.P. signed and ordered by Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson and the other Justices on 9/19/2005 taking effect on 12/1/2005 in all pending cases.
THIS CASE further demonstrates why private citizen Koetter is a Racketeer, Abuser and Misuser of Judicial Power, Trespasser, Usurper, Conspirator, Corruptor, and Traitor — ALL IN ONE!
Imagine you both standing behind bars!
How do you feel about being locked up in a prison cell like this, Mr. Hill?
See AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION; & AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE, 42 USC § 1985, CIVIL CONSPIRACY & RICO CLAIMS for details.
See the new post:
WARNINGS TO RANDAL W. HILL, ESQ.: YOU VIOLATED TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT! Posted on September 24, 2013.
Ha! Ha! Ha! Koetter believed my misleading statement so easily!
Getting a summary judgment granted is a piece of cake!