“I require three things in a man. He must be handsome, ruthless and stupid.” —
Dorothy Parker (American short-story Writer and Poet, 1893-1967)
You look handsome, Mr. Williams, but do you have the other two attributes, i.e., ruthlessness and stupidity, Dorothy requires?
Does racketeering qualify for ruthlessness?
Does rendering VOID Orders/Judgments without jurisdiction, power or authority qualify for ruthlessness or stupidity or both?
SKIPPER KOETTER IS MERELY ONE OF THE RACKETEERS; SO IS JUDGE WILLIAMS! Posted on September 25, 2013. In this post, I had no time to cover the wrongs inflicted on me by Judge Williams. Here are the reasons why I sued him in his personal and official capacities together with the other conspirators/racketeers:
Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. had no standing.
The 96-8-13090 Court had no Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
1. Judge Kemper Stephen Williams rendered a VOID Judgment in Cause No. 96-8-13090 for Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. without subject matter jurisdiction on June 20, 1997. The Judgment was procured by committing fraud on the court by Anita L. Koop, Terry J. Cox, Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., and their attorneys, Richard T. Chapman & Thomas George.
2. On March 30, 2011, Chen became aware of the non-entity status of Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. through Texas Secretary of State’s Office. Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. (ARPI) has had neither factual nor legal existence since June 6, 1993 when its ASSUMED NAME CERTIFICATE expired upon its 10th anniversary, i.e., June 5, 1993. See PR1 ASSUMED NAME CERTIFICATE OF Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. Expired on 6/5/93.
3. Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc., having lost its corporate status on June 5, 1993 without renewing its Assumed Name Certificate, had no standing (See AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1-23) when it initiated the deficiency judgment proceedings, and Judge Williams had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and enter any Order or Judgment. Thus, the June 20, 1997 Order/Judgment was VOID ab initio. It must be set aside in that “All courts have a duty to vacate void orders.” Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (1974). See SECOND WARNING TO SUNILANDINGS LOT/HOME OWNERS: THE WARRANTY DEEDS ISSUED BY ANITA’S REORT PROEPRTIES, INC. ARE FRAUDULENT, INVALID AND WORTHLESS! Posted on October 29, 2012.
4. The June 14, 2012 Letter by Judge Williams to District Clerk Ms. Hartgrove is quoted in pertinent part as follows: “Re: Paul Chen, Pro Se vs. Rick Perry, et. al. I’ve been provided a copy of the above petition and I’ve reviewed Judge Koetter’s Orders in Cause No. 10-6-28. Pursuant to Sec. 11.102, Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, you are ordered to not file the above petition unless and until I, as local administrative judge, grant permission for the petition to be filed.” See AMENDED Cover Letter + PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 Posted on May 23, 2013; Skipper Koetter, you don’t even know what “vexatious” and “frivolous” mean! Posted on May 17, 2013; Can you conscientiously think of me as “a vexatious litigant”, and my causes of action as “frivolous”? Posted on September 30, 2012; and AMENDED PAUL CHEN’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION Posted on May 13, 2013 (See The following 61 paragraphs focus on challenging Judge Koetter’s erroneous ruling labeling Chen a vexatious litigant filing frivolous lawsuits.).
5. In light of the above grounds, this Letter Order is in violation of Chen’s First Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances, the Texas open courts doctrine, and TRCP Rule 145, amended, signed, and entered by Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson and other Justices of the Texas Supreme Court on 9/19/2005. Rule 145 provides in pertinent part: “Upon the filing of the affidavit, the clerk must docket the action, issue citation and provide such other customary services as are provided any party.” Chen filed multiple Affidavits of Indigency, but the Clerk failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 145. The June 14, 2012 Letter Order by Judge Williams is to blame!
6. The restrictions imposed on Chen by Judge Williams are unreasonable and arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statutes. Furthermore, having been named as one of the Defendants in various causes of action in the federal and state courts, including the PETITION FOR SECTION 1983 AND STATE LAW CLAIMS filed on June 4, 2012 that he unlawfully intercepted to benefit himself, Judge Williams should have recused/disqualified himself instead of illegally stopping Chen from exercising his constitutional and statutory rights.
7. Chen’s well-pled, well-recognized common law and civil rights causes of action have been unreasonably, arbitrarily, and repeatedly restricted by the VOID Orders/Judgments rendered by Judges Williams and Koetter in various cases.
8. A judgment is void when the court does not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or “lacks the inherent power to enter the order involved.” Petersen, 16 Wash. App. at 79 (citing Bresolin, 86 Wash. 2d at 245; Anderson, 52 Wash. 2d at 761) (additional citation omitted).
9. Irrespective of whether a party moves to vacate a judgment, the courts have inherent authority to vacate a void judgment. Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68.
10. All courts have a duty to vacate void orders. Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (1974) (“A void judgment is a legal nullity and a court considering a motion to vacate has no discretion in determining whether it should be set aside.” 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice, 60.25.”).
Order/Judgment Obtained by Fraud upon the Court is VOID ab initio.
11. “Fraud upon the court” has been defined as that fraud committed by an officer of the court in any attempt to deceive, either by commission, by omission, by speech, by silence, by gesture, by innuendo, by look, etc. Whenever this fraud is committed in a court of law by any attorney or judge, it is a “fraud upon the court”. In re Eugene Lee Armentrout et al., Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983); Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858 (1977); In re Lamberis, 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549 (1982); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (1985); Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (1948).
12. Fraud upon the court by an attorney, whether or not intrinsic or extrinsic, can be used to set aside a prior judgment. Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 79 S.E.2d 605 (2003) 37. We have the inherent power to vacate the judgment of the Court, fashion an appropriate remedy, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991); Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 250; Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2001), and sanction a party or its lawyers for willful abuse of the judicial process, particularly when the party or its lawyers have intentionally practiced a fraud upon the court. Levander, 180 F.3d at 1119; see also Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2001).
13. Courts possess the inherent power to vacate or amend a judgment obtained by fraud on the court, Toscano v. CIR, 441 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1971), but that power is narrowly construed, applying only to fraud that defiles the court or is perpetrated by officers of the court. When we conclude that the integrity of the judicial process has been harmed, however, and the fraud rises to the level of “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decisions,” we not only can act, we should. England v. J Doyle, 281 F.2d at 309; Levander v. Prober, 180 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Intermagnetics Am., Inc. v. China Int’l Trust and Inv. Corp., 926 F.2d 912, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1991).
14. “… Where a lawyer engages in a conspiracy to commit a fraud upon the court by the production of fabricated evidence and by such means obtains a judgement then the enforcement of the judgement becomes manifestly unconscionable’ and a court of equity may devitalize the judgement.” See Sutter v. Easterly (Mo) 189 SW2d 288. Id, at 288. (“His scheme and conspiracy were such a violation of a lawyer’s duty to the court — a duty imposed not alone by the principles of honesty and good morals but also by a code of ethics adopted as rules of court, as to amount to a fraud on the court for which equity will grant relief.”)
A Judgment Entered Without Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Void.
15. If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void. Pifer v. Pifer, 31 N.C. App. 486, 229 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1976).
16. A judgment entered by a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992). Also, it is the longstanding rule that such a void judgment may be attacked at any time in any proceeding. Id. ; Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988); Lammers Land & Cattle Co. v. Hans, 213 Neb. 243, 328 N.W.2d 759 (1983) . It may be impeached in any action, direct or collateral. Marshall v. Marshall. Stanton v. Stanton, 146 Neb. 71, 18 N.W.2d 654 (1945); Hassett v. Durbin, 132 Neb. 315, 271 N.W. 867 (1937). See, also, Shade v. Kirk, 227 Neb. 775, 420 N.W.2d 284 (1988). That is because a void judgment is in reality no judgment at all. Marshall v. Marshall.
17. This court has further held that when a void judgment is entered it can be attacked at any time, directly or collaterally, whenever the question is raised. (Citation omitted). The rule therefore is that due diligence is not a necessary fact to be proven when it is alleged and proved that the petitioner’s constitutional rights have been violated. It was not necessary for appellees to prove that due diligence was used in filing their petitions. 07/30/86 DANNY J. RAY v. STATE INDIANA 496 N.E.2d 93.
18. It has long been established as basic law that the validity of a judgment depends upon the court’s jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter of the particular issue it assumes to decide. Considering what is meant by the term “jurisdiction” it is well settled that this term includes the court’s power to enter the judgment, and the entry of a decree which the court has no authority to enter is without jurisdiction and void. A void judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally. Newman v. Bullock, 23 Colo. 217, 47 Pac. 379; Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 95 Colo. 435, 37 P (2d).
19. “A void judgment lacks validity anywhere and is subject to attack from any angle.” State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Sandefur, 215 Tenn. 690, 701, 389 S.W.2d 266, 271 (1965); Acuff v. Daniel, 215 Tenn. 520, 525, 387 S.W.2d 796, 798 (1965).
20. Any interested party may move to set aside a void judgment. High v. Southwestern Insurance Co., Okl., 520 P.2d 662 (1974). A different statutory rule applies when the judgment sought to be vacated is alleged to be void. Under the provisions of 12 O.S. 1971 § 1038 any party affected by a void judgment has an independent claim for vacation. It may seek vacation at any time. Jent v. Brown, Okl., 280 P.2d 1005, 1008 .
A Judgment Violating a Citizen’s Right to Due Process is Void.
21. Textile Banking Company, Inc. v. Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 1981) (“If the underlying judgment is void because the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or because the entry of the order violated the due process rights of the respondent, the trial judge has no discretion and must grant appropriate Rule 60(b) relief.”).
22. A judgment issued from a proceeding that violates a citizen’s right to due process is void. State v. Rehbein, 235 Neb. 536, 455 N.W.2d 821 (1990); State v. Von Dorn, 234 Neb. 93, 449 N.W.2d 530 (1989); State v. Ewert, 194 Neb. 203, 230 N.W.2d 609 (1975); In re Application of Maher, North v. Dorrance, 144 Neb. 484, 13 N.W.2d 653 (1944); In re Betts, 36 Neb. 282, 54 N.W. 524 (1893). A void judgment may be set aside at any time and in any proceeding. VonSeggern v. Willman, 244 Neb. 565, 508 N.W.2d 261 (1993); Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 482 N.W.2d 1 (1992); State v. Ewert,; Ehlers v. Grove, 147 Neb. 704, 24 N.W.2d 866 (1946); Hayes County v. Wileman, 82 Neb. 669, 118 N.W. 478 (1908). ‘A void judgment may be attacked at any time in any proceeding.’” Marshall v. Marshall, 240 Neb. 322, 328, 482 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1992).
23. There has been a denial of due process and the judgment is void. Plaintiff, however, contends that defendant has failed to show a meritorious defense. But since the judgment was void, defendant did not have to show a meritorious defense. 7 Moore, Federal Practice, § 60.25(2) at 264 (2d ed.). See the following cases in which a void judgment was ordered vacated upon motion without any discussion of the question whether a meritorious defense was shown: Shilhan v. Ho, 40 Haw. 302; Gouveia v. Nakamura, 13 Haw. 450; Phoenix Metals Corp. v. Roth, supra, 79 Ariz. 106, 284 P.2d 645. In Wise v. Herzog, 114 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.) it was held that a meritorious defense need not be shown when the attack on the void judgment was by motion in the original suit. To the same effect are Schwarz v. Thomas, 222 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.) and Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410 (8th Cir.). Cf., Perkins v. Sykes, supra.
24. “A void judgment lacks validity anywhere and is subject to attack from any angle.” State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Sandefur, 215 Tenn. 690, 701, 389 S.W.2d 266, 271 (1965); Acuff v. Daniel, 215 Tenn. 520, 525, 387 S.W.2d 796, 798 (1965).
25. This Court had no authority to make a finding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. The People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) (“If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, – it had no authority to make that finding.”).
26. The 96-8-13090 Court’s allegation that it has subject-matter jurisdiction was not supported by the record of the case. The court acted without jurisdiction.
The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Rests upon Plaintiffs.
27. When subject-matter is denied, the party who claims that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction has the burden to prove that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Bindell v. City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) (“the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it.”); Loos v. American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841 (1988) (“Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff.”).
28. When subject-matter jurisdiction is denied, it becomes the responsibility of the party claiming that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to prove that the court holds subject-matter jurisdiction. Bindell v. City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) (“the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it.”); Ballard v. Fred E. Rawlins, M.D., Inc., 101 Ill.App.601, 428 N.E.2d 532 (1981) (“Where jurisdiction is denied by the defendant, the burden of proving its presence rests upon the party asserting it.”).
29. The 96-8-13090 Court is not a party to the proceeding and therefore has no lawful authority to assert or prove that it has subject-matter jurisdiction.
Any Proceedings Founded upon a Void Judgment are Equally Worthless.
30. A void judgment is a mere nullity, and any proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. See Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 17, 154 N.W. 701, 703 (1916); Neylan v. Vorwald, 124 Wis.2d 85, 99, 368 N.W.2d 648, 656 (1985). A void judgment cannot create a right or obligation, as it is not binding on anyone. See id.
31. Defendant’s argument is supported by the general rule that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Le Clair v. Calls Him, 106 Okl. 247, 233 P. 1087 (1925). “A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested; from it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are necessarily equally worthless, and have no effect whatever upon the parties or matters in question. A void judgment neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it, and all claims flowing out of it, are absolutely void. The parties attempting to enforce it are trespassers.” High v. Southwestern Insurance Company, 520 P.2d 662, 1974 OK 35 (Okla. 03/19/1974).
32. The general rule is that a void judgment is no judgment at all. Where judgments are void, as was the judgment originally rendered by the trial court here, any subsequent proceedings based upon the void judgment are themselves void. In essence, no judgment existed from which the trial court could adopt either findings of fact or conclusions of law. Valley Vista Development Corp. v. City of Broken Arrow, 766 P.2d 344, 1988 OK 140 (Okla. 12/06/1988).
33. “‘It is a general rule of law that a judgment which is null and void is subject to collateral attack.’ 31 Am. Jur. 181, sec. 583. ‘A void judgment may be impeached in a collateral proceeding.’ 34 C.J. 510.” Drainage District No. 1 v. Village of Hershey, 139 Neb. 205, 211, 296 N.W. 879, 882 (1941). See, also, Davis Management, Inc. v. Sanitary & Improvement Dist. No. 276, 204 Neb. 316, 282 N.W.2d 576 (1979); County of Douglas v. Feenan, 146 Neb. 156, 18 N.W.2d 740 (1945).
A Void Judgment is Good Nowhere and Bad Everywhere.
34. A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity. Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). Also, a void judgment has been defined as “one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at anytime and at any place directly or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758). It has also been held that “It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or, collateral.’ Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.).
35. A void judgment implies no judgment at all, and its nonexistence may be declared upon collateral attack, upon suggestion of an amicus curiae, or by the court at any time upon its own motion.” Lowery v. State Life Ins. Co. (1899), 153 Ind. 100, 102, 54 N.E. 442, 443. Generally there is no requirement for one subjected to a “void” judgment to do anything more than call the trial court’s attention to the mistake with a request that the same be corrected pursuant to Trial Rule 59. See State, ex rel. Eggers v. Branaman (1932) 204 Ind. 238, 183 N.E. 653.
A Void Judgment Cannot Constitute Res Judicata.
Res Judicata does not Bar Collateral Attacks on Void Judgment.
36. A void judgment cannot constitute res judicata. Denial of previous motions to vacate a void judgment could not validate the judgment or constitute res judicata, for the reason that the lack of judicial power inheres in every stage of the proceedings in which the judgment was rendered. Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508, 1960 OK 266 (Okla. 12/27/1960).
37. A void judgment amounts to nothing and has no force as res judicata.” Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Coffelt, 301 Ark. 112, 782 S.W.2d 45 (1990).
38. In Halbach v. Halbach, 259 Wis. 329, 331, 48 N.W.2d 617 (1951), the void judgment was challenged ten years after entry. The court stated that laches did not apply even if the plaintiff had been dilatory or lackadaisical in his efforts to overturn the judgment. ” It is the duty of the court to annul an invalid judgment.” A void judgment cannot be validated by consent, ratification, waiver, or estoppel. Furthermore, void judgments may be attacked collaterally.
39. Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1985) (after judgment awarded, defendant paid, then found out this was action in admiralty that should have been brought solely against United States; court held that judgment was void); Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4th Cir. 1979) (judgment by default awarded penalty wages under inapplicable statute; court held that judgment was void, not just erroneous); see also V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that judgment can be void if court’s action involves a “plain usurpation of power”); Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1963) (court had no power to impose unconstitutional prior restraint on publication of true statements, so thirty-year-old consent judgment was void).
40. Laches does not operate to preclude the opening or vacating of a void judgment, for the reason that no amount of acquiescence can make it valid. 03/05/51 SLACK v. GRIGSBY 97 N.E.2d 145.
41. Void judgments may be vacated regardless of the lapse of time. In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d 612, 618-19, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989). Consequently, not even the doctrine of laches bars a party from attacking a void judgment. Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d at 619-20.
42. As to an act or omission rendering the judgment void, it is well settled that even though a void judgment is a nullity and may be ignored by those whose rights are attempted to be affected thereby, a court will not permit such a judgment to encumber the record, but will vacate the ineffectual entry thereof on proper application, although the application is made after the term of the rendition of the judgment. Even the lapse of a period of years does not necessarily preclude relief, which is sometimes declared available regardless of what length of time has intervened since the rendition of the judgment. Laches does not operate to preclude the opening or vacating of a void judgment, for the reason that no amount of acquiescence can make it valid. 03/05/51 SLACK v. GRIGSBY 97 N.E.2d 145.
A Void Order may be Attacked at Any Time in Any Proceeding.
43. A court may at any time relieve a party from a void judgment. A judgment entered by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is a void judgment and may be vacated at any time on the court’s own motion or upon the motion of any party thereto, including the party who originally invoked the jurisdiction of the court. Carpenter v Dennison, 208 Mich 441 (1919); Orloff v Morehead Manufacturing Co, 273 Mich 62 (1935); Shane v Hackney, 341 Mich 91 (1954); Millman Brothers, Inc v Detroit, 2 Mich App 161 (1966); Carpenter v Dennison, 208 Mich 441 [175 NW 419] (1919); Banner v Banner, 45 Mich App 148, 153; 206 NW2d 234 (1973).
44. “If the order is void, it may be attacked at any time in any proceeding,” Evans v Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990); “a void judgment, order or decree may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally” Oak Park Nat. Bank v Peoples Gas Light & Coke Col, 46 Ill.App.2d 385, 197 N.E.2d 73, 77 (1st Dist. 1964); “that judgment is void and may be attacked at any time in the same or any other court, by the parties or by any other person who is affected thereby.”. It is also clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court at any time.” People v. Wade, 116 Ill.2d 1, 506 N.E.2d 954 (1987)
45. A collateral proceeding may not generally be used to contradict or impeach a final judgment. La Presto v. La Presto, 285 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. 1955). However, a void judgment “is entitled to no respect, and may be impeached at any time in any proceeding in which it is sought to be enforced or in which its validity is questioned by anyone with whose rights or interests it conflicts.” Id. The reported cases are clear that an attack upon a void judgment is not subject to the “reasonable time” requirements of Rule 74.06. Williams v. Williams, 932 S.W.2d 904, 905-06 (Mo. App. 1996); State ex rel. Houston v. Malen, 864 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Mo. App. 1993) (questioned on other grounds by Brackett v. Laney, 920 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. App. 1996)). In Williams, the Eastern District held that a direct attack filed eight years after entry of a void default judgment was timely under Rule 74.06. See Williams, 932 S.W.2d at 905-06. Similarly, in Houston, the appellate court approved of a direct attack upon a judgment filed four years and three months after the judgment was entered. See Houston, 864 S.W.2d at 430.
The Court Has Not Only the Power But the Duty to Vacate a Void Judgment.
46. “The court has not only the power but the duty to vacate the inadvertent entry of a void judgment at any time, either during the term or after the term, with or without a motion therefor[e].” See Bridgman v. Moore, 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W.2d 705, at page 707.
47. Where a void judgment has been rendered and the record in the cause, or judgment roll, reflects the vice, then the court has not only the power but the duty and even after the expiration of the term to set aside such judgment. Harrison v. Whiteley, Tex.Com.App., 6 S.W.2d 89.
48. There is no . . . discretion on the part of a court reviewing a void judgment. Schoffstall v. Failey (1979), Ind.App., 389 N.E.2d 361.
49. A trial court has no discretion when faced with a void judgment, and must vacate the judgment “whenever the lack of jurisdiction comes to light.” Mitchell v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990).
The Court Lacked Inherent Power to Render Its Void Judgment.
The Court Only Held Inherent Power to Vacate Its Void Judgment.
50. “A void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally,” People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).
51. The courts through their inherent judicial power, have the authority to do all things reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice, whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or not. This holds particularly true in the case of a void judgment. Laschanzky v. Laschanzky, 246 Neb. 705, 523 N.W.2d 29 (1994).
52. In Van DeRyt v. Van DeRyt (1966), 6 Ohio St. 2d 31, 36, 35 Ohio Op. 2d 42, 45, 215 N.E.2d 698,704, we stated, “A court has an inherent power to vacate a void judgment because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was always a nullity.”
53. A court has an inherent power to vacate a void judgment because such an order simply recognizes the fact that the judgment was always a nullity.” The term “inherent power” used in the two preceding cases is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 782 as “[a]n authority possessed without its being derived from another. A right, ability, or faculty of doing a thing, without receiving that right, ability, or faculty from another.” Because this claim challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, it was not barred by res judicata because a void judgment may be challenged at any time. See State v. Wilson (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 45-46, 652 N.E.2d 196, 200, fn. 6.
TO BE CONTINUED.