I. State Law Claims: False Arrest, Wrongful Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution

State Law Claims: False Arrest, Wrongful Imprisonment, and Malicious Prosecution

This document dealing with state actors and Section 1983 Actions against Federal Judges are the main body of pleadings scheduled to be filed on Monday, June 4, 2012. Some revisions are required. However, I have been doing my best to put together the relevant legal theories and controlling case law to support my factual findings and allegations.

I have been posting the legal research results here for about fifty days. A lot of them will be incorporated into the final formal Complaint against all the Defendants. Thanks to WordPress for making it possible to have the corrupt judiciaries, conspirators and co-conspirators exposed. May justice be served!

Lack of Jurisdiction and VOID Orders/Judgments

  1. Questions of jurisdiction, of course,   should be given priority—since if there is no jurisdiction there is no   authority to sit in judgment of anything else. See Steel Co., supra, at 93-102.
  2. “Jurisdiction is power to declare   the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the   court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the 779*779 cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869).
  3. Even jurisdiction over the person (as   opposed to subject-matter jurisdiction) “is `an essential element of the   jurisdiction of a district . . . court,’ without which the court is   `powerless to proceed to an adjudication.’ ” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S.   574, 584 (1999)   (quoting Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374, 382   (1937)).    V-06-78, 6:09-mc-11
  4. Thus, Plaintiff’s challenges to   (attacks on) all the VOID Orders/Judgments are based on the courts’ lack of   subject matter jurisdiction and that of personal jurisdiction. Such VOID   Orders/Judgments must be vacated in the interest of justice.

  1. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the six well-pleaded complaints previously filed in Civil Actions: 6:05-mc-00002 and V-06-78, the files in Case Nos. 93-21204-V-11, 96-24925-VS-7, Adversary No. 98-6007, Civil Action Case No. 02-4794, Lead Case No. 4:04cv3084 and Member Case No.4: 04cv3426, Consolidated Case No. 4:04cv3084, 6:09-mc-11, 610-cv-00056 Chen v Rainey, 96-8-13090, 10-6-28, 10-6-29 10-6-13752, 12-4-1596 in 24th Judicial District Court, 2010-CR-0234 & 2010-CR-0235 in County Court at Law No. 1 of Calhoun County with the same force and effect as if herein set forth.
  1. I.                   Sheriff B.B. Browning’s False/Unlawful/Wrongful Arrest

Other Claims filed in Complaints # 4 & 5 in Case # V-06-78 arerealleged herein.

  1. Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff B.B. Browning violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause.  An individual who has been wrongfully arrested or seized under the color of law can make a § 1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment. Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2009). “[I]n order for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the police officer lacked probable cause.” Id. (quoting Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Davenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “But under § 1983, an arresting agent is entitled to qualified immunity if he or she could reasonably (even if erroneously) have believed that the arrest was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information possessed at the time by the arresting agent.” Everson, 556 F.3d at 499 (citations omitted). We must consider the information possessed by the officer in the totality of the circumstances because “an officer cannot look only at the evidence of guilt while ignoring all exculpatory evidence.” Everson, 556 F.3d at 498. Likewise, an officer may not make “hasty, unsubstantiated arrests with impunity.” Id.
    1. While federal law dictates whether probable cause existed for the arrest, “[w]hether an officer is authorized to make an arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law.” Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979)). Because the law is “clearly established that, absent probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed, was being committed, or was about to be committed, officers may not arrest an individual,” Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999).
    2. Defendants maintain that they had probable cause to arrest and charge Chen under Texas Gov. Code 51.903(e).  Plaintiff maintains that the Defendants lacked probable cause because Texas Gov. Code 51.903(e) is not applicable in that the 87 cases cited in the AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING clearly show that a notice of lispendens has no extraordinary evidentiary value, that it is merely an “affidavit” having no more evidentiary weight than any other affidavit, that it is not a “lien”, that the filing a notice of lispendensclaiming an interest or lien does not have the effect of creating any interest,  that it is a “privilege”, that the ‘facts and circumstances establishing a statutorily legitimated affirmative justification for the suspected criminal act’ are clear and unambiguous, and that these are all clearly established by the abundant Texas caselaw.
    3. We look to the information possessed by Defendants at the time of the arrest. Everson, 556 F.3d at 499. See Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371–72 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that police officers may not “simply turn a blind eye toward potentially exculpatory evidence known to them”).  These facts all support the district court’s conclusion that the Defendant officers lacked probable cause because they possessed all of the facts (notices of lis pendens are not liens) necessary to determine that Plaintiff had not violated the plain language of the Texas statute at the time of his arrest.
    4. What is clear is that Defendants cited the wrong Texas Penal Code Section 32.49in concert to support their statement of law in erroneously and maliciously charging Plaintiff with the two criminal offenses.
    5. Defendants might argue that they were missing one additional piece of information; they were unaware that Texas statute and abundant case law excepted Plaintiff’s behavior.
    6. The question is whether it was reasonable for Sheriff Browning, et al. to believe that the arrest of Plaintiff for filing and refusing to release notices of lis pen dens was lawful in light of the information possessed by the arresting officers and clearly established law. Everson, 556 F.3d at 499.
    7.  “‘In general, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible.’” Everson, 556 F.3d at 499 (quoting Fridley, 291 F.3d at 872). But,“[q]ualified immunity ordinarily applies unless it is obvious that no reasonably competent official would have concluded that the actions taken were unlawful.” Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
    8. By protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments.” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). Furthermore, the doctrine of qualified immunity applies “irrespective of whether the official’s error was a mistake of law or a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (citing Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815). The record before us shows that this was not a mistake of fact because the Defendant officers possessed all of the necessary information to know that Plaintiff’s conduct was legal. Thus, the more narrow question is whether the Defendants’ alleged mistake about the Texas Penal Code Section 32.49, the Texas Lis Pendens statute, and a great body of case law was reasonable.
    9. In a line of cases, our Court has addressed a somewhat analogous situation, whether an officer has probable cause to arrest an individual who may have an affirmative justification for a suspected criminal act. See Fridley, 291 F.3d at 872; Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 1999); Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007 (6th Cir. 1999). In both Dietrich and Painter, the arrestee was charged with carrying a concealed weapon despite the presence of a statute that provided that an individual engaged in a business activity that is particularly susceptible to criminal attack has an affirmative defense to the charge. Painter, 185 F.3d at 564–65; Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1010–11. In both cases we denied qualified immunity, holding that the arresting police officers lacked probable cause because the officers were aware of sufficient facts and circumstances to establish that the arrestee had a statutorily legitimated affirmative justification for the suspected criminal act at the time of the arrest. Painter, 185 F.3d at 571; Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1012.
    10. Here, the arresting officers Sheriff Browning, Deputy Sheriff Abraham, and Investigator lacked probable cause because they were aware of sufficient facts and circumstances to establish that the arrestee had a statutorily legitimated affirmative justification for the suspected criminal act, filing and refusing to release Notices of Lis Pendens, at the time of the arrest.
    11. In Fridley, we discussed the meaning of the two cases. We identified the general rule as follows: “probable cause determinations include ‘facts and circumstances establishing a statutorily legitimated affirmative justification for the suspected criminal act.’” 291 F.3d at 873 (quoting Painter, 185 F.3d at 570). Then we explained two corollaries to this rule. First, “‘a peace officer, in assessing probable cause to effect an arrest, may not ignore information known to him which proves that the suspect is protected by an affirmative legal justification.’” Id. (quoting Painter, 185 F.3d at 571). Next, we noted that the general rule “‘does not mandate that law enforcement operatives should conduct quasi-trials as a necessary predicate to the warrantless arrest of perpetrators. . . . Rather, [the] court . . . merely resolves that, where a reasonable officer would conclusively know that an investigative target’s behavior is protected by a legally cognizable affirmative defense, that officer lacks a legal foundation to arrest that person for that behavior.’” Id. (quoting Painter, 185 F.3d at 571 n.21).
    12. In these cases, when we refer to whether an officer would conclusively know that the defendant is protected by an affirmative defense, we have focused entirely on the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest; not on the officer’s knowledge, or lack thereof, of the statute that provides the defense. Knowledge of the statute is imputed to the police officers. Here, Defendants have not advanced an argument against imputing knowledge of the Texas Penal Code, the Texas Lis Pen dens statute, and a great body of controlling case law to the police officers.
    13. The language and meaning of this statute and the cited case law is unambiguous, and we see no reason to hold that it would be reasonable for an officer to be ignorant of the very statute that he is enforcing.
    14. At first blush it might seem unduly harsh to have an expectation that law enforcement officers should know the intricacies of criminal statutes, but this position finds support in other areas of the qualified immunity doctrine that regularly impute officers. Indeed, it is a touchstone of qualified immunity doctrine that “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). For instance, we impute knowledge of state-law definitions and state-court interpretations of a statute to police officers when we decide whether an officer could reasonably conclude that probable cause exists under a given set of circumstances. See, e.g., Kennedy, 635 F.3d at 215–16; Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341–43 (6th Cir. 2007). Likewise, we impute knowledge of clearly established constitutional caselaw to police officers when we state that the “binding precedent from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, the district court itself, or other circuits that is directly on point,” places a law enforcement official “‘on notice that [his] conduct violates established law.’” Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 527 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)); see also Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 358–61 (6th Cir. 2007) (imputing knowledge of First Amendment principles to an officer, and holding that probable cause did not exist because the officer should have known that the defendant’s conduct was protected by the Constitution, even though it was probably prohibited by the statute); Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 350 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that we expect a reasonably competent officer to know the law governing his conduct but suggesting that it might be unfair to impute knowledge of a case to an officer only four days after the case is decided).
    15. Indeed, an ignorance of the law defense—especially when the law is clear— in the qualified immunity context “might foster ignorance of the law or, at least, encourage feigned ignorance of the law.” Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 909–10 (6th Cir. 1975). Permitting an officer to be ignorant of the law would also draw a stark contrast with our long tradition of imputing knowledge of criminal statutes to the general public. See e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 (1998) (noting that the traditional rule is that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” for a defendant’s criminal conduct).
    16. In light of these principles, and the abundantly plain language of the statute at issue here, we hold that the Defendant officers did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for filing and refusing to release notices of lis pendens because the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officers established a statutorily affirmative justification of the suspected criminal act. Fridley, 291 F.3d at 873. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to this claim.
    17. Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“The most significant difference between City of Canton and this case is that the former dealt with a municipality’s liability whereas the latter deals with an individual supervisor’s liability. The legal elements of an individual’s supervisory liability and a political subdivision’s liability, however, are similar enough that the same standards of fault and causation should govern.”), cert. denied sub nom Lankford v. Doe, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (“We have set forth three elements necessary to establish supervisory liability under § 1983: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive andunreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,’ and (3) that there was an ‘affirmative causal link’ between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.” citing Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 68 (1994); Walker v. Norris,917 F.2d 1449, 1455-56 (1990) (applying City of Canton analysis to issue of supervisory liability); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1116-1117 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).  Compare Rosenberg v. Vangelo, No. 02-2176, 2004 WL 491864, at *5 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2004) (unpublished) (“[W]e respectfully disagree with the Ricker Court’s decision to cite and rely on the ‘direct and active’ language from Grabowski.
    18. We also conclude that the deliberate indifference standard had been clearly established prior to 1999 and no reasonable official could claim a higher showing would be required to establish supervisory liability.”) with Ricker v. Weston, No. 00-4322, 2002 WL 99807, at *5, *6 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2002) (unpublished) (“A supervisor may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his or her subordinate’s unlawful conduct if he or she directed, encouraged, tolerated, or acquiesced in that conduct.
    19. For liability to attach, however, there must exista causal link between thesupervisor’s action or inaction and the plaintiff’s injury. . . . See also Tardiff v. Knox County, 397 F.Supp.2d 115, 141-43 (D.Me. 2005)(“Unlike individual officer liability, the liability of supervisory officials does not depend on their personal participation in the acts of their subordinates which immediately brought about the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. . .”
    20. Liability can result from Sheriff Browning’s acquiescence to Calhoun County Jail’s ongoing practice of denying all detainees charged with misdemeanors any opportunity to do legal research with deficient library facilities. The stringent Jail Regulations effectively deprive all the detainees of the 1st Amendment right to access the courts for redress of grievances in that only a 2-inch pencil and a few sheets of paper were allowed. Plaintiff’s legal books, laptop, six boxes of legal files were forbidden; even a request for 30 minutes to retrieve the computer files was denied. Such restrictions seriously hampered and damaged Plaintiff’s capability to prepare for defense of the two criminal charges and five civil actions pending.

II. Magistrate Judge Kurtz violated the clearly established law and

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

  1. The      initiation of accusatory processes, such as criminal prosecutions or civil      contempt proceedings, is a non-judicial act      that may subject a judge to liability. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272      (6th Cir.1984). At this stage, the Supreme Court held that the magistrate      or the prosecutor has only qualified immunity, which cannot protect him or      her from committing wrongs against the innocent citizens.
  2. And      in Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme Court again concluded:      A judge or justice may be censured for “setting ‘grossly excessive’      bail and [thus] showing a ‘severe attitude’ toward witnesses and      litigants.” The Michigan Supreme Court censured a trial judge      recently for “Excessive Bail, Severe Attitude.”
  3. The      right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving      adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if      found guilty. Ex-parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704, 710 (1835).
  4. Like      the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand      as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond      or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as      additional assurance of the presence of an accused. Bail set at a      figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose      is “excessive” under the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Motlow, 10 F. 2d 657 (1926, opinion by Mr.      Justice Butler as Circuit Justice of the Seventh Circuit).      See Stack v. Boyle, 342 US 1 – Supreme Court 1951.
  5. Whether      a defendant’s initial court appearance is instigated by a prosecutor or by      the police alone, its consequences for the defendant are the same: he has      been formally accused of a crime, his liberty may be restrained, and he      must negotiate the “intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal      law,” Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, to defend against the charges. In either      event, such a proceeding initiates a “criminal prosecution[]” under the      Sixth Amendment.
  6. From      the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 91, to the present      Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46 (a) (1), federal law has      unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be      admitted to bail. This traditional right to freedom before conviction      permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to      prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. See Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 277, 285 (1895).      Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence,      secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning. Here,      having been arrested for a non-capital offense, misdemeanor, Plaintiff “shall be      admitted to bail” to enjoy the “traditional right to freedom before      conviction to permit the unhampered preparation of a defense, and to prevent      the infliction of punishment prior to conviction.”      Besides the two criminal charges, Plaintiff had four (4) civil cases in      the state court and one (1) in the federal court pending. The      34-days’unlawful incarceration denying access to Plaintiff’s seven boxes      ofprinted legal files and legal research documents stored in the notebook      computer seriously hampered Plaintiff’s      preparations for the defense and inflicted      punishment prior to conviction.
  7. The      right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary      judicial proceedings against the defendant. Cf. Kirby v. Illinois,      supra, at 406 U. S. 688-689.      This interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is consistent      not only with the literal language of the Amendment, which requires the      existence of both a “criminal prosecutio[n]” and an      “accused,” but also with the purposes that the right to counsel      serves, including assuring aid at trial and at “critical” pretrial      proceedings when the accused is confronted with the intricacies of      criminal law or with the expert advocacy of the public prosecutor, or      both. Pp. 467 U. S. 187-189.      Plaintiff’s release on July 10, 2010 without the $45,000 bail bond      initially demanded by Magistrate Judge Kurtz is tantamount to admission of      the prosecution’s being guilty of getting Plaintiff incarcerated for      filing and refusing to release the allegedly fraudulent Notices of LisPendens; the criminal charges are contrary to      the facts and a great body of case law.
  8. At      the initial appearance, the magistrates have no jurisdiction to accept any      final plea in the cases. Their only job is administrative, or ministerial      in nature. They are to advise the accused of the charges, to set bond if      bond is appropriate, and to advise the accused of his right to counsel and      to get the administrative process going. The magistrates have only      qualified immunity because their initial custodial interrogation is      non-judicial. If the accused is an indigent, and asks for an appointed      counsel at this stage, neither the police nor the magistrates are allowed      to interrogate the accused in the absence of court-appointed attorney.
  9. Stack      v. Boyle 342 U.S. (1951) the Supreme Court: A judge or justice may be      censured for “setting ‘grossly excessive’ bail and [thus] showing a ‘severe      attitude’ toward witnesses and litigants,” as the Michigan Supreme      Court did to a trial judge recently: “Judge Censured for Excessive      Bail, Severe Attitude.”
  10. In      this case, the detached, neutral Magistrate Judge Noska reduced the bond      from $50,000 to $20,000 based on the papers before him on the morning of      June 8, 2010. However, in the afternoon Plaintiff was taken to the      magistrate court to appear before another pro-prosecution Judge Kurtz, who      charged Plaintiff with filing fraudulent notices of lispendens and refusing to release them. She      demanded that Plaintiff sign the releases. Plaintiff said: “OK, I’ll sign      the releases under protest.” She was so infuriated that she increased the      bond from $20,000 to $45,000 in addition to coercing Plaintiff to sign the      releases. This custodial interrogatory confrontation took place in the      complete absence of Plaintiff’s court-appointed attorney Chris Janak.      Judge Kurtz’s custodial interrogation violated Plaintiff’s 6th      Amendment right to counsel assistance at the initial appearance before the      supposedly detached and neutral magistrate for probable cause      determination. Judge Kurtz’s grossly excessive bail bond requirement of      $45,000 instead of the $5,000 for each of the two cases stopped Plaintiff      from being bailed out. And her demand that Plaintiff sign the releases      violated Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights to “life, liberty      and/or property” in that 1) the notices of lis      pendens      represented Plaintiff’s lost moneys and stolen property interests of      $75,000,000+ against all the Defendants in numerous civil actions; 2) the      claim of $75,000,000+ also represented that the Defendants’ wrongdoings      had reduced Plaintiff’s life from riches to rags; and 3) the 34 days of      incarceration without any probable cause and with improper purposes      deprived Plaintiff of his liberty interests.
  11. Judge      Kurtz was wearing three hats in the informal non-adversarial magistrate      court and served as the magistrate judge, the prosecutor, and the police      at the same time in prosecuting this indigent victim in the absence of his      court-appointed attorney in violation of the 6th Amendment. In      the process of probable cause determination the magistrate judge was      supposed to be impartial to both sides, not to side with the prosecutor      and arbitrarily send Plaintiff to jail for 34 days. As      a misdemeanor arrestee, this indigent Plaintiff      should have been provided with prompt counsel assistance and released on      personal bond within 24 hours.      See Art. 17.033 (a) at 15 below.
  12. Under      Gideon, the presence of a lawyer is deemed      essential to fundamental fairness. In the absence of probable cause and      with an improper purpose, Judge Kurtz unfairly and unlawfully deprived      Plaintiff of liberty interest without the presence of the court-appointed      attorney, who did not contact or      interview Plaintiff until more than 10 days later in violation of the 6th      Amendment and Texas law.
  1. A magistrate shall release a defendant on personal bond unless good cause is shown otherwise if the: (1) defendant is not charged with and has not been previously convicted of a violent offense. See SECTION 5. (a) Chapter 17, Art. 17.032. (b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
  2. Plaintiff asserts that he was wrongfully charged with a misdemeanor, and that he had never been convicted of a violent offense. Thus, he was entitled to have been released on personal bond within 24 hours of the false arrest, not after 34 days of wrongful imprisonment.
  3. Art. 17.04. REQUISITES OF A PERSONAL BOND. A personal bond is sufficient if it includes the requisites of a bail bond as set out in Article 17.08, except that no sureties are required. In addition, a personal bond shall contain:

(1) the defendant’s name, address, and place of employment;

(2) identification information, including the defendant’s:

(A) date and place of birth;

(B) height, weight, and color of hair and eyes;

(C) driver’s license number and state of issuance, if any; and

(D) nearest relative’s name and address, if any; and

(3) the following oath sworn and signed by the defendant:

“I swear that I will appear before (the court or magistrate) at (address, city, county) Texas, on the (date), at the hour of (time, a.m. or p.m.) or upon notice by the court, or pay to the court the principal sum of (amount) plus all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred in any arrest for failure to appear.

  1. The $45,000 bail bond and demand for releases of notices of lis pendens, incarceration without allowing personal bond within 24 hours, false arrest without a warrant, wrongful imprisonment of 34 days in the absence of probable cause and prompt counsel assistance violated SECTION 5. (a) Chapter 17, Article 17.033 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

III. Malicious Criminal Prosecution and Civil Damages Claims against DA, et al.

I. The Elements of Malicious Criminal Prosecution:

  1. To      recover for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a criminal      proceeding was commenced against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant      initiated or procured the proceeding; (3) the proceeding was terminated in      the plaintiff’s favor; (4) the plaintiff was innocent of the crime      charged; (5) the defendant lacked probable cause to initiate the criminal      proceeding; (6) the defendant acted with malice; and (7) the plaintiff      suffered damages. Id. (citing Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d      515, 517 (Tex. 1997)). In the present case, Plaintiff proves the      following:
  2. On      June 7, 2010, Defendants Sheriff B.B. Browning,      and Assistant DA Shannon Salyer had Plaintiff arrested,      handcuffed, booked, mug shot, fingerprinted, incarcerated, and a criminal      proceeding was commenced against Plaintiff.
  3. Defendants      Sheriff B.B. Browning, Assistant DA Shannon Salyer, and Judge Hope Kurtz initiated and Defendants Roberts,      Koop, et al. procured the proceeding with fraudulent      affidavits/complaints. Sheriff Browning, Assistant DA Salyer and      Magistrate Judge Kurtz played active roles in starting      or continuing, with malice and a lack of probable cause, the two criminal      charges, procured, directed by Roberts, Cox/Koop/ARPI, et al., and aided      by Jay Workman, Emily Allen, and Port Lavaca Wave.
  4. The      proceeding was terminated in Plaintiff’s favor on      4/24/2012 in that the DA had the two criminal cases dismissed after 23      months of undue delay without getting a public jury trial as Plaintiff had      demanded in writing. The DA’s Motion to Dismiss was      ORDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED, AND GRANTED by Judge Alex Hernandez on April      24, 2012.
  5. Now      that the two criminal charges have been dismissed, all      the named Defendants are responsible in some way for      the initiation or continuation of the baseless, frivolous suit, and must      be held liable for malicious prosecution in the abuse or misuse of the      legal process.
  6. Plaintiff      was innocent      of the crimes charged because the 87 Texas precedents he cited clearly and      convincingly demonstrate that a notice of lis pendensdoes      not create a lien, that it is only a “Memorandum” or an “Affidavit”, that      filing and refusing to release notices of lis pendens was      an “absolute privilege”, that it was not a crime, and that (a) “The      purpose of the lis penden doctrine is not to      give notice that a cla[i]mant has filed suit to assert the claim – only that he has a claim.” Paddock v. Williamson, 9      S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1928, writ ref’d); (b) “The act      of filing the suit was absolutely privileged.” See Prappas v. Meyerland      Community Improvement Association, 795 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.1990, reh’g of      writ overruled) (filing of the lis pendens,      even if not authorized by statute, is absolutely privileged and ‘does not      turn on the presence or absence of good faith’); Griffin v. Rowden, 702      S.W.2d 692 (Tex.App.1985, writ ref’dn.r.e.) (lis pendens      absolutely privileged). [1]
  7. Defendants      Sheriff B.B. Browning, Assistant DA Shannon Salyer, Judge Hope Kurtz, et      al. lacked probable      cause to initiate the criminal      proceeding in light of the ample controlling case law. They      began or continued the two criminal cases without      probable cause to do so. In other words, they did not have a reasonable      belief in Plaintiff’s guilt or liability. In the present case, the      complaint, information, or indictment was dismissed without a plea of      guilty or nolo contendere being      entered; and the attorney general determines that the complaint,      information, or indictment presented against the person was dismissed      because: (A) the presentment was made on mistake, false information, or      other similar basis, indicating absence of probable cause to believe, at the time of the      dismissal, the person committed the offense. See TEX CP. CODE ANN. §      104.0035.
  8. The      court will look at several factors: 1) the sources were unreliable; 2) a      great body of case law on lis pendens was      available; 3) obtaining such information required only a little effort in      conducting proper legal research; 4) no opportunities were given to      Plaintiff to offer an explanation; 5) Plaintiff’s reputation was totally      ruined; and 6) a speedy judicial action in the original two cases was      required by the 6th Amendment.
  9. The failure to fully investigate the facts surrounding the      suit against Plaintiff and the termination of the original cases in      Plaintiff’s favor are sufficient to prove a lack of probable cause. The 87      Texas lis pendens precedents, and Plaintiff’s numerous      cases: 6:05-mc-00002, V-6-78, V-9-11 & 610-cv-00056 Chen v. Rainey      filed in the Federal Court that are entitled to be reinstated pursuant to Rule 1-041(E)(2) of      Rules Enabling      Act [2] are material      facts sufficient to allow a reasonable person to infer that Sheriff      Browning, Assistant DA Salyer and Magistrate Judge Kurtz acted without a      reasonable belief in Plaintiff’s guilt or liability in beginning or      continuing the suit against Plaintiff’s filing and refusing to release the      notices of lis pendens.
  10. Supervised by DA Dan Heard and prosecuted by Assistant DA      Henderson until 4/24/2012 when the two 23-month protracted criminal      charges were dismissed by Judge Alex Hernandez in Plaintiff’s favor,      Defendants Sheriff B.B. Browning, Assistant DA Shannon Salyer, Judge Hope      Kurtz, Jail Administrator, et al. had acted with malice, invidious      discrimination and selective prosecution[3]in      violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights, which makes it necessary to notify AG      Greg Abbott pursuant to TEX      CP. CODE ANN. § 104.003: Texas Statutes – Section 104.003: LIMITS ON      AMOUNT OF RECOVERABLE DAMAGES Subsection (a) (1) $100,000 to a single      person indemnified and, if more than one person is indemnified, $300,000      for a single occurrence in the case of personal injury, death, or deprivation      of a right, privilege, or immunity.
  11. Sheriff      Browning instituted or continued the original proceeding with an improper      purpose. Sheer ill will or bad faith constitutes an improper purpose, and      it may be proved with facts that show that Sheriff Browning resented      Plaintiff and wanted somehow to harm Plaintiff for filing notices of lis pendens against his home and Calhoun County      because he was the County’s policy maker and was      one of the Defendants in Plaintiff’s six Complaints      filed in Cases Numbered 6:05-mc-00002, and V-6-78. He certainly showed      personal malice and hostility toward Plaintiff.
  12. Defendants      were motivated by something other than the purpose of bringing Plaintiff      to justice. Improper purpose usually must be inferred from facts and      circumstances because most defendants deny having any improper purposes.      If it is impossible to discover any apparent purpose, an improper purpose      may be inferred from the lack of probable cause. See Hodges v. Gibson      Products Co. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); see      also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed. 2d      209 [1993].
  13. Plaintiff      was deprived of his 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th,      8th, and 14th Amendment rights to “life, liberty,      and property” in violation of due process[4], equal protection, Texas “Open      Courts” guarantee, Plaintiff’s right to access      the court for redress of grievances, and Plaintiff suffered both economic and      non-economic damages, including, but not limited      to, loss of all assets & reputation, humiliation, pain, suffering,      mental anguish, physical and emotional distress.
  1. The Texas Constitution’s open courts guarantee provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”  Const. art. I, § 13. This provision assures that a person bringing a well-established common-law cause of action will not suffer unreasonable or arbitrary denial of access to the courts.   Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.1996).  Sax v. Votteler, 648 “[I]t is, quite plainly, a due process guarantee.”   S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex.1983); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 48 S.W.2d 944, 946-48 (1932).
  2. A statute has the effect of denying access to the courts if it unreasonably abridges a plaintiff’s right to obtain redress for injuries caused by the wrongful acts of another.  Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 665. Here, the Jail Regulations had the effect of denying access to the courts because they unreasonably abridged Plaintiff’s right to do legal research to obtain redress for injuries caused by the wrongful acts of the named Defendants under color of state law.
  3. According to the Texas Supreme Court, procurement, which is the causation element of a malicious prosecution action, occurs when a person’s actions are enough to cause the prosecution, and but for the person’s actions the prosecution would not have occurred. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. 1994). A person does not procure a prosecution, however, when the decision to prosecute is left to the discretion of a law enforcement official or grand jury unless the person provides information he knows is false. Id.; King v. Graham, 126 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex. 2003). Roberts, Koop, et al. filed criminal complaints with the DA’s office, which caused the prosecution. But for their wrongful actions the criminal charges against Plaintiff would not have occurred.
  1. Roberts,      being an experienced real estate attorney, Cox/Koop/ARPI, being      represented by experienced attorneys, procured the prosecution because      they provided      information they knew or should have known was false.
  2. However,      if a person knowingly provides false information to those responsible for      procuring the prosecution, the person has procured the prosecution for      purposes of a malicious prosecution action. Id. This exception is      satisfied not only when actual false information is provided, but when the      reporting person fails to report facts that might establish the accused is      not guilty of any offense. Eans, 580 S.W.2d at 20 (holding circumstantial      evidence was sufficient for jury to have concluded corporation procured      prosecution where reporting persons failed to disclose material facts      favorable to accused). Here, the reporting persons, Roberts, Koop, et al.,      failed to disclose material facts favorable to Plaintiff, particularly the      80+ Texas lis pendens cases establishing      that the accused was not guilty of any criminal offense.
  3. A      person acts with malice in a malicious prosecution      case when he acts with ill will or evil motive to the injury of another,      or acts in reckless disregard of the rights of another and with      indifference as to whether the other person is injured so as to amount to      wanton and willful action knowingly and unreasonably done. Id. Malice can      be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence and may be      inferred from a lack of probable cause. Thrift, 974 S.W.2d at 80.      Here, the reporting persons, Roberts, Koop, et al., and all the other      Defendants causing the false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and 23 months      of undue delay without a public jury trial acted with malice      and with a lack of probable cause; otherwise, the      DA would not have the two criminal charges dismissed.
  4. Of      course a person has the legal right to report a crime. See Closs, 874      S.W.2d at 878. However, if a person reports a crime with an improper      purpose, or in reckless disregard of the rights of another in a knowing      and unreasonable manner, that is malice. Id. Here, the reporting persons,      Roberts, Koop, et al., reported the alleged crimes with an improper      purpose, or in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff in a knowing      and unreasonable manner, that is malice.
  5. Richey,      952 S.W.2d at 519-20 (holding that in malicious prosecution action,      failing to fully and fairly disclose all relevant facts or knowingly      providing false information to the DA is relevant to malicious intent      of defendant); Thrift, 974 S.W.2d at 80 (holding defendant’s failure to      disclose exculpatory facts was sufficient to demonstrate malice).      Here, the fact that Defendants Roberts, Koop, et al. failed to fully and      fairly disclose all relevant facts or knowingly provided false information      to the DA and the Sheriff was relevant to their malicious intent      and their failure to disclose exculpatory facts was sufficient to demonstrate malice.
  6. A      malicious prosecution action against a corporate entity may be based on an      agent taking action to procure a prosecution. See Eans v. Grocery Supply      Co., 580 S.W.2d 17, 21-22 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no      writ) (malicious prosecution judgment upheld against corporation based on      actions of corporate employees). Here, ARPI, and RROW are liable for the      malicious prosecution actions that their corporate employees took to      procure the prosecution.

IV. Prosecutors are Liable for Giving Erroneous Legal Advice[5]

or Making Defamatory Statements[6]

  1. After Plaintiff was arrested, handcuffed in front of Calhoun County Courthouse, and after he complained of false arrest, Sheriff Browning had Deputy Abraham and the investigator take the accused to the D.A.’s office to get legal advice. Plaintiff was ordered to wait outside and was not allowed any opportunity to defend himself. The Assistant D.A. Salyer’s erroneous legal advice resulted in Plaintiff’s being unlawfully booked, fingerprinted, mug shot and wrongfully imprisoned for 34 days with neither a notice nor a hearing.
  2. No Warrant for Arrest was shown to Plaintiff at the time of the arrest and the purported Warrant for Arrest was placed in the DA’s file sometime after the arrest and the citations were only served while Plaintiff was in jail in clear violation of due process.
  3. In re Burns v. Reed, No., 500 U.S. 478 (1991), the Supreme Court held: A state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983 for participating in a probable cause hearing, but not for giving legal advice to the police about their conduct of an investigation, P P. 484-496 or for making defamatory statements at a press conference after a prosecution had been initiated. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). These two wrongful acts were exactly what Assistant D.A. Salyer did on June 7, 2010 in giving erroneous legal advice on the filing of the notices of lis pendens to the Sheriff and in making defamatory statements against Plaintiff to Port Lavaca Wave reporters, Jay Workman and Emily Allen, after Plaintiff had been arrested, incarcerated, and a prosecution had been initiated.
  4. Advising the police in the investigative phase of a criminal case is not so “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” that it qualifies for absolute prosecutorial immunity. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991)

[1]AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING

V. CIVIL CONSPIRACY

A. Civil Conspiracy Claims against Assistant DA, Sheriff and Other Co-conspirators

  1. The primary issue in conspiracy cases where      the attorney is a named defendant is whether the attorney is acting in      pursuit of his or her professional duties to the client or is acting in      concert with the client to commit a wrong. Although most courts require      proof of an underlying claim in order to hold the attorney liable for      conspiracy, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Morganroth v.      Delorean, that attorneys who assisted their clients in fraudulent      transfers were liable for civil conspiracy, even without proving an      underlying claim of fraud. 123 F.3d. 374 (6th Cir. 1997).
  2. The case record makes it clear that Chapman      has been acting in concert with his clients, Cox/Koop/Anita’s, Gerken and      Lennar, to commit wrongs of wrongful foreclosures, fraudulent transfers,      fraudulent deficiency judgments, and false proofs of claims against      Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s estate and the Taiwanese Joinders. Thus, Chapman      and George must be charged with civil conspiracy.
  3. An attorney can similarly be liable for civil      conspiracy if he knowingly agrees to defraud a third party. Bernstein v.      Portland Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 850 S.W.2d 694, 706 (Tex. App. –Corpus      Christi 1993, writ denied); Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696      S.W.2d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
  4. Evidence of an attorney’s knowledge of the      fraudulent nature of his and others’ actions and intent to share the      fruits (Chapman $65,000, George 3 lots, Morrison 4 lots, Burch 2 lots,      Haddad     ) of that fraud can defeat a claim that      the attorney was ignorant of the fraud and acting solely at the clients’      direction and can expose the attorney to liability for conspiracy.      Bernstein, 850 S.W.2d at 706. Mere knowledge and silence are not enough to      prove conspiracy, however; because of the attorney’s duty to preserve      client confidences, there must be indications that the attorney agreed to      the fraud. Id.; see also Greenberg Traurig of N.Y., P.C. v. Moody, 161      S.W.3d 56, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).  Chapman        $65,000 attorneys’ fees and Cox’s $7,500 Trustee’s fees
  5. ‘The elements of an action for civil      conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage      resulting to plaintiff from an act or acts done in furtherance of the      common design. . . . In such an action the major significance of the      conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the      wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing      from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and      regardless of the degree of his activity.” (Doctors’ Co. v. Superior      Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 44, citing Mox Incorporated v. Woods (1927) 202      Cal. 675, 677-78.)’ (Id. at 511.)
  6. ‘Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a      legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not      actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate      tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. By participation      in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her      own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy.      In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the      immediate tortfeasors. Standing alone, a conspiracy does no harm and      engenders no tort liability. It must be activated by the commission of an      actual tort. ”A civil conspiracy, however atrocious, does not per se give      rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been committed      resulting in damage.” ‘A bare agreement among two or more persons to harm      a third person cannot injure the latter unless and until acts are actually      performed pursuant to the agreement. Therefore, it is the acts done and      not the conspiracy to do them which should be regarded as the essence of      the civil action.’ [para.s] By its nature, tort liability arising from conspiracy      presupposes that the coconspirator is legally capable of committing the      tort, i.e., that he or she owes a duty to plaintiff recognized by law and      is potentially subject to liability for breach of that duty.’ (Allied      Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at 510-11.)
  7. Plaintiff      alleges      that the Defendants conspired      to violate his civil      rights by “entering into an agreement to carry out the planned unlawful arrest.” Defendants argue that the      district court erred in denying qualified immunity as to these claims. A      civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons      to injure another by unlawful action.” Revis      v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007).
  8. To      successfully plead a civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs must allege that “(1) a      single plan existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial      objective to deprive the Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and      (3) an overt act was committed.” Id. (citation omitted).
  9. Elements of a civil conspiracy      are: (1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a      meeting of the minds in the object or course of action; (4) one or more      unlawful overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof. Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 234      Kan. 957, 967, 678 P.2d 153 (1984). In order for civil conspiracy to lie,      the claim must base itself on a valid, actionable underlying tort. 234      Kan. at 967; Knight v. Neodesha      Police Dept., 5 Kan. App. 2d 472, 476, 620 P. 2d 837 (1980).
  10.  “Express agreement among all the      conspirators is not necessary to find the existence of a civil conspiracy      [and] [e]ach conspirator need not have known all of the details of the      illegal plan or all of the participants involved.” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985).
  11. “If      a private party has conspired with state officials to violate      constitutional rights, then that party qualifies as a state actor and may      be held liable pursuant to § 1983.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 953      n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Wyatt v.      Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168–69 (1992)).
  12. Private      citizens are generally not entitled to qualified immunity from suit under      § 1983. Id. at 952.
  13. Plaintiff      does not,      necessarily, allege that Affidavits and meeting with the press were unconstitutional, just that      they were executed      in furtherance (to justify) the unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff      has alleged      that the Defendants conspired to carry out at least one unconstitutional      act, the warrantless arrest without probable cause. As evidence of the plan and      conspiracy, Plaintiff points      to Affidavits submitted by Roberts, AK, et al as well as 2 news      reports posted at Port Lavaca Wave and      the meetings with the press (Roberts and Salyer) that admitted of entering into a      conspiracy to conduct this unlawful activity in furtherance (to justify)      the unconstitutional conduct.
  14. If      we had determined that there was no underlying constitutional harm, we      would grant qualified immunity here, see Revis, 489 F.3d at 386–87, however, our determination that a      constitutional violation could be proven at this stage of the litigation      defeats the Defendant officers’ assertion of qualified immunity, see White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806,      815 (8th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the denial      of qualified immunity as to this claim is justified.
  15. Plaintiff      brings      state-law claims of false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecution,      and intentional      infliction of emotional distress against Sheriff Browning,      Salyer, Kurtz, and Jail Administrator.
  16. Defendants      may argue      that their conduct “cannot be described with malicious purpose, in bad      faith, or in wanton or reckless manner.” However, as discussed above, a      jury could determine that the Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest      Plaintiff, which supports an inference of malice. Melanowski, 131 N.E. at 361. Plaintiff could also demonstrate      bad faith by proving that Sheriff Browning, et al. had no reason to believe      Plaintiff filed fraudulent notices of lis pendens and refused to release      them, a      necessary element to the charge of fraud.      Furthermore, bad faith and malice could be shown by proving Plaintiff’s allegations that after      the arrest, the      Defendants      caused a warrant to      be placed in the case file in hopes of justifying the warrantless      false arrest without probable cause.
  17. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts      such that a reasonable jury could conclude that Sheriff      Browning, and the other Defendants      were acting with malice or bad faith in arresting and charging Plaintiff      with neither due process nor probable cause.
  18. There      is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that all nine elements of actionable fraud were      present here. Plaintiff’s obvious damages, which resulted from the false      arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and malicious prosecution without probable      cause, were the deprivation of his 1st, 4th, 5th,      6th, 7th, 8th, and 14th      Amendment rights to “life, liberty and property” in addition to loss of      reputation, and infliction of emotional stress.

Fraud Committed in Furtherance of the Civil Conspiracy Fraud Claims

  1. To      survive summary judgment dismissal of his fraud claim, Plaintiff had to      make a prima facie showing on each of nine elements: (1) that Defendants      made a representation of an existing fact, (2) it was material, (3) it was      false, (4) Defendants knew that it was false, (5) Defendants intended that      Plaintiff should act on it, (6) Plaintiff was ignorant of its falsity, (7)      Plaintiff relied on the truth of the representation, (8) Plaintiff had a      right to rely on the representation, and (9) Plaintiff suffered damages as      a result. Farrell v. Score, 67 Wn.2d 957, 958-59, 411 P.2d 146 (1966).

(1)   Defendants made a representation of an existing fact: Notices of Lis Pendens are liens.

(2)   it was material: The representation was on court record in Case 2010-CR-0234 & Case 2010-CR-0235.

(3)   it was false: The representation was misleading, false, and wrong.

(4)   Defendants knew that it was false: 87 Texas precedents cited in Plaintiff’s AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BASED ON ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AND QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE OF LIS PENDENS FILING filed on August 31, 2010 are clear and convincing evidence that Defendants knew or should have known that it was false.

(5)   Defendants intended that Plaintiff should act on it: Defendants in their criminal charges intended that Plaintiff should accept the criminal charges without any resistance.

(6)   Plaintiff was ignorant of its falsity: Plaintiff was ignorant of its falsity during the 34-day wrongful imprisonment without any chance to do any legal research on the relevant issues.

(7)   Plaintiff relied on the truth of the representation: Plaintiff relied on the truth of the representation under duress in spite of its falsity.

(8)   Plaintiff had a right to rely on the representation: Being forbidden to access any computer or printed legal files to conduct any legal research, Plaintiff had a right to rely on the representation though to his detriment.

(9)   Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the false arrest, 34-day wrongful imprisonment, 23 months of undue delay in violation of his speedy trial right, etc.

  1. While      all conspirators named as defendants are, as a rule, jointly and severally      liable for any damages arising from the conspiracy, the plaintiff need not      join all conspirators as defendants and may, in fact, name only one. Hanover      Fire Ins Co of New York v Furkas, 267 Mich 14, 21, 255 NW 381 (1934).      Also, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of acts done or statements made      by any conspirator to further the common purpose, whether or not that      conspirator is a party defendant. Brown v Brown, 338 Mich      492, 504, 61 NW2d 656 (1953), cert denied, 348 US 816      (1954).
  2. A      civil conspiracy is, at its root, “an agreement, or preconceived plan, to      do an unlawful act.” Bahr v Miller Bros Creamery, 365 Mich 415,      427, 112 NW2d 463 (1961). The elements of a cause of action for civil      conspiracy in Michigan are (1) a concerted action (2) by a combination of      two or more persons (3) to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful      purpose by criminal or unlawful means, (4) causing damage to the      plaintiff. Fenestra, Inc v Gulf American Land Corp, 377 Mich565,      593, 141 NW2d 36 (1966); Mays v Three Rivers Rubber Corp, 135      Mich App 42, 48, 352 NW2d 339 (1984).
  3. “An      allegation of conspiracy, standing alone, is not actionable.” Magid v      Oak Park Racquet Club Associates, 84 Mich App 522, 529, 269      NW2d 661 (1978) (citing Roche v Blair, 305 Mich 608, 614—616, 9      NW2d 851 (1943)). In other words, the mere agreement to commit an unlawful      act is not actionable; a civil conspiracy action is one for damages arising      out of the acts committed pursuant to the conspiracy. Fenestra, 377      Mich at 593—594; Auto Workers* Temple Ass*n v Janson, 227      Mich 430, 433, 198 NW 992 (1924); Krum v Sheppard, 255 F Supp 994,      998 (WD Mich 1966), aff*d, 407 F2d 490 (6th Cir 1967); 16 Am      Jur 2d Conspiracy §49, at 267 (1979).
  4. An      allegation of civil conspiracy “must be coupled with a substantive theory      of liability in order to sustain a cause of action.” Mohammed v Union      Carbide Corp, 606 F Supp 252, 257 (ED Mich 1985) (citing Earp v      Detroit, 16 Mich App 271, 275, 167 NW2d 841 (1969)); Early      Detection Center, PC v New York Life Ins Co, 157 Mich App 618, 632,      403 NW2d 830 (1986) (“since plaintiffs have failed to state any actionable      tort theories in their proposed amended complaint, the conspiracy theory      must also fail”); Cousineau v Ford Motor Co, 140 Mich App 19, 37,      363 NW2d 721, cert denied, 474 US 971 (1985); Magid v Oak Park      Racquet Club Associates, 84 Mich App 522, 529, 269 NW2d 661      (1978).
  5. Many      different theories of liability, both tort and nontort, have supported      actions for civil conspiracy. See, e.g., Roche v Blair, 305 Mich      608, 9 NW2d 861 (1943) (conspiracy to defraud); Temborius v Slatkin,      157 Mich App 587, 403 NW2d 821 (1986) (same); Borsuk v Wheeler, 133      Mich App 403, 349 NW2d 522 (1984) (same); Durant v Stahlin, 374      Mich 82, 130 NW2d 910 (1964) (conspiracy to libel); Northern Plumbing      & Heating, Inc v Henderson Bros, mc, 83 Mich App 84, 268 NW2d 296      (1978) (conspiracy to breach contract); Mays v Three Rivers Rubber      Corp, 135 Mich App 42, 352 NW2d 339 (1984) (conspiracy by employer and      insurance company to deprive disabled employee of benefits); Brown v      Brown, 338 Mich 492, 61 NW2d 656 (1953), cert denied, 348 US      816 (1954) (conspiracy to alienate affections).
  6. A      statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is made “by      a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the      conspiracy on independent proof of the conspiracy.” MRE      801(d)(2)(E) (emphasis added).   The untrue      Affidavits submitted by Roberts, et al. & the two erroneous news      reports posted by Jay Workman and Emily Allen of Port Lavaca Wave were not      hearsay because they were offered against Plaintiff and were made by the co-conspirators of Sheriff      Browning and A.D.A. Salyer      during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy
  7. To      establish the third element of a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must prove      that the defendants either had an unlawful purpose or used      unlawful means; a plaintiff need not establish both facts. Fenestra,      Inc. v Gulf American Land Corp, 377 Mich565, 579, 141 NW2d 36      (1966).
  8.  “All those who, in pursuance of a common      plan to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it and further it by      cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer,      or who ratify and adopt the acts done for their benefit, are equally      liable with the wrongdoer.” Rosenberg v Rosenberg Bros Special Account,      134 Mich App 342, 354, 351 NW2d 563 (1984) (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook      of the Law of Torts §46, at 292 (4th ed 1971)).
  9. Once      a civil conspiracy is established, “whatever was done in pursuance of it      by one of the conspirators is to be considered as the act of all, and all      are liable irrespective of the fact they did not actively participate      therein.” Brown v Brown, 338 Mich 492, 503, 61 NW2d 656 (1953)      (quoting Warsop v Cole, 292 Mich 628, 291 NW 33 (1940)), cert      denied, 348 US 816 (1954). However, “[i]t is only where means      are employed, or purposes are accomplished, which are themselves tortious,      that the conspirators who have not acted but have promoted the act will be      held liable.” W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §46,      at 324 (5th ed 1984) (footnotes omitted).
  10. It      is well established in Michigan and elsewhere that liability for acts      taken in pursuance of a civil conspiracy is joint and several. Brown, 338      Mich at 503; LA Young Spring & Wire Corp v Falls, 307 Mich 69,      106, 11 NW24 329 (1943). But even when a formal agreement does not exist      and, hence, no action for conspiracy lies, a plaintiff may still be able      to recover from the defendants jointly if the defendants’ acts constitute a joint      tort.
  11. A      conspiracy also exists when a corporation, through its officers or agents,      conspires with another entity or a person outside that corporation. Borsuk      v Wheeler, 133 Mich App 403, 349 NW2d 522 (1984). This is so even when-      the actions of the corporate agents or employees are contrary to the      corporation’s best interests, as long as the actions are within the      agents’ scope of authority. Id. at 410—411. A different question arises      when a plaintiff alleges a conspiracy among several agents or employees of      the same corporation. This combination of actors is not recognized as a      conspiracy. The general rule is that a corporation does not “conspire”      with its own agents or employees when the agents or employees are acting      within the scope of their employment and not for personal purposes.      Doherty v American Motors Corp, 728 F2d 334, 339 (6th Cir 1984); Schroeder      v Dayton-Hudson Corp, 448 F Supp 910, 915 (ED Mich 1977), modified on      another issue, 456 F Supp 650 (ED Mich 1978).
  12. Two      separate entities are required in a conspiracy claim; a corporation and      its own agents or employees are considered to be one entity. Doherty, 728      F2d at 339 (quoting Nelson Radio & Supply Co v Motorola, 200 F2d 911,      914 (5th Cir 1952), cert denied, 345 US 925 (1953)).
  13. It      is clear that the mere agreement to do a wrongful act can never amount to      a tort, whether or not it may be a crime, and that some act must be      committed by one of the parties in pursuance of the agreement, which is      itself a tort. The gist of the action is not the conspiracy charged, but      the tort working damage to the plaintiff. On the other hand, there are      certain types of conduct, such as boycotts, in which the element of      combination adds such a power of coercion, undue influence or restraint of      trade, that it makes unlawful acts which one man might legitimately do. See      McAlpine v AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, mc, 461 F Supp 1273 (ED Mich      1978).
  14. In      alleging conspiracy, a plaintiff need not specify the exact means used to      carry out the illegal purpose. Goldsmith v Moskowitz, 74 Mich App 506,      521, 254 NW2d 561 (1977). However, claiming conspiracy is not sufficient      when the facts pleaded do not disclose a conspiracy. Coronet Development      Co v FSW, Inc, 3 Mich App 364, 369, 142 NW2d 499 (1966), aff*d, 379 Mich      302 (1967).
  15. Proof      of a conspiracy is generally circumstantial. Bahr v Miller Bros Creamery,      365 Mich 415, 421, 112 NW2d 463 (1961). However, conspiracy may not be      assumed (Harvey v Lewis, 357 Mich 305, 311, 98 NW2d 599 (1959)), and      evidence of conspiracy must “support a reasonable inference that two or      more persons planned or acted in concert to accomplish an unlawful end.”      Rencsok v Rencsok, 46 Mich App 250, 252, 207 NW2d 910 (1973) (citations      omitted). As stated in Temborius v Slatkin, 157 Mich App 587, 600, 403      NW2d 821 (1986):  The agreement, or      preconceived plan, to do the unlawful act is the thing which must be      proved. Direct proof of agreement is not required, however, nor is it      necessary that a formal agreement be proven. It is sufficient if the      circumstances, acts and conduct of the parties establish an agreement in      fact. Furthermore, conspiracy may be established by circumstantial      evidence and may be based on inference. (Footnote omitted.)
  16. Furthermore,      while all conspirators named as defendants are, as a rule, jointly and      severally liable for any damages arising from the conspiracy, the      plaintiff need not join all conspirators as defendants and may, in fact,      name only one. Hanover Fire Ins Co of New York v Furkas, 267 Mich 14, 21,      255 NW 381 (1934). Also, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of acts done      or statements made by any conspirator to further the common purpose,      whether or not that conspirator is a party defendant. Brown v Brown, 338      Mich 492, 504, 61 NW2d 656 (1953), cert denied, 348 US 816 (1954).
  17. If      it is alleged that a party to a contract and a third party have conspired      to cause a breach of that contract, the plaintiff must show a writing      sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds to establish that the contract      exists. Northern Plumbing & Heating, Inc v Henderson Bros, mc, 83 Mich      App 84, 91, 268 NW2d 296 (1978); Jaques v Smith, 62 Mich App 719, 720, 233      NW2d 839 (1975). The rationale for this rule is that if the contract is      not enforceable between the parties, no wrongful act is committed by      failing to perform the contract. Therefore, if a party to an unenforceable      contract conspired with a third party to induce non-performance of the contract,      no unlawful act would result because the contracting party has no      enforceable obligation to perform. Note that this result differs from the      rule for tortious interference claims discussed in §2.3.
  18. In Chevalier v. Animal      Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1993), the      court noted that Texas considered the statute of limitations to be merely      a bar to recovery, rather than a substantive defense attacking the merits      of the case–the wrongful act still existed. As a result, the underlying      bad act could support a conspiracy claim even where the statute of      limitations had run on that act. 839 F. Supp at 1232-33. In Texas, civil      conspiracy is considered to be an action for personal injury to another      and has an independent 2-year period of limitations. Stevenson      v. Koutzarov, 795 S.W. 2d 313, 318 (Tex. App. 1990), writ den.      (Jan. 30, 1991).

VII. Counties & Cities Have No Immunity from Liability under § 1983

  1. Local governments sued under      § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity,” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232,      416 U. S. 248. P. 436 U. S. 701.
  2. In re Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) the US      Supreme Court held in pertinent part:  A      municipality has no immunity from liability under § 1983 flowing from its      constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its      officers as a defense to such liability. Pp. 445 U. S. 635-658. “a      municipality has no “discretion” to violate the Federal      Constitution.” Pp. 445 U. S. 644-650.
  3. By its terms, § 1983      “creates a species of tort liability that, on its face, admits of no      immunities.” Imbler v. Pachtman,      424 U. S. 409, 424 U. S. 417. Its language is absolute and unqualified,      and no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may      be asserted. Rather, the statute imposes liability upon “every      person” (held in Monell v. New      York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, to encompass      municipal corporations) who, under color of state law or custom,      “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United      States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities      secured by the Constitution and laws.”
  4. It has been clear that a      public official may be held liable in damages when his actions are found      to violate a constitutional right and there is no qualified immunity, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308      (1975); Procunier v. Navarette,      434 U. S. 555 (1978). Today the Court recognizes that this principle also      applies to a local government when implementation of its official policies      or established customs inflicts the constitutional injury. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs.,      436 U.S. 658 (1978)
  5. In re Monell v. Department of Soc. Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the      U.S. Supreme Court held: Local governing bodies (and local officials sued      in their official capacities) can, therefore, be sued directly under §      1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief in those situations      where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional      implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or      decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts      may fairly be said to represent official policy. In addition, local      governments, like every other § 1983 “person,” may be sued for      constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental      “custom” even though such custom has not received formal      approval through the government’s official decisionmaking channels. Pp.      436 U. S. 690-691. In Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.’s opinion      announcement, governmental “custom” includes persistent and      widespread discriminatory practices of local officials.
  6. Plaintiff      establishes the County Policy Makers’ deliberate indifference by      demonstrating a failure to train officials in a specific area such as the      statute and case law involving notices of lis pendens where there is      an obvious need for training and continuing education for all the law      enforcement personnel including, but not limited to, judges, magistrates,      clerks, DA, Assistant DAs, Sheriff, deputy sheriffs, and Jail      Administrator to avoid violations of citizens’ constitutional and statutory rights.
  1. To allege the official capacity suits against the County, Plaintiff asserts that Calhoun County Sheriff’s Department, District Attorney’s Office, the Magistrates, the judges, and the Clerk’s Office were the moving forces behind the deprivations of Plaintiff’s federal and statutory rights and that the entities’ policies and customs played a factor. “Governmental ‘custom’ includes persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of local officials.”

Qualified Immunity

  1.  “In order to prevail on a      civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must establish      that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right      secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Everson v.      Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The plaintiff      must also overcome the defense of qualified immunity, which if granted,      shields government officials from personal liability. Id.  “The      doctrine protects all but the      plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Id. To that end, we ask two      questions to determine whether qualified immunity applies: “(1) whether,      considering the allegations in a light most favorable to the party      injured, a constitutional right      has been violated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established.” Id; see also Saucier      v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). We are free to address these questions      in any sequence. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009).
  2. The Fourth Amendment ensures “[t]he right of the people to be      secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects[ ] against      unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Payton v. New      York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (internal citations and quotation marks      omitted).
  3. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is a ‘basic principle      of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are      presumptively unreasonable,” id. at 586, in absence of exigent circumstances or consent.
  4. A supervisory officer may be liable under § 1983 if it is shown      that the superior officer “encouraged      or condoned the actions of [the inferior officer].” Bass v.      Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999). A respondeat superior      theory of liability will not suffice here because liability must be      based on more than the right to control employees or simple negligence. See      id. “At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least      implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the      unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Shehee v.      Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Hays v. Jefferson      County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)).

Malicious Prosecution Action & Civil Conspiracy Action against Cox/Koop/ARPI, ET AL.

B. Malicious Prosecution Action against Cox/Koop/ARPI, ET AL.

Other Claims filed in Complaints # 2 & 5 in Case # V-06-78 and 6:09-mc-11are realleged herein.

  1. The elements of the malicious      prosecution action against Cox/Koop/ARPI and those officers of the court      involved in procuring the VOID Orders/Judgments by committing fraud upon      the federal/state courts are:
    (1) that Defendants filed, prosecuted the underlying civil actions and procured various VOID      Orders/Judgments against Plaintiff: See AMENDED DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIM      PLAINTIFF’S COUNTERCLAIMS AND AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF (95-106) filed on April      10, 2012, posted here on May 22, 2012;

(2) that favorable terminations of each of the prior cases, in which the innocence of the former defendant, Plaintiff in this case, shall be established in light of ARPI’S lack of standing, and the COURTS’ lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

(3) that it is evident that since 6/6/1993 when its Assumed Certificate expired, ARPI has lacked standing to sue, that the courts have lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the cases involving this factually and legally non-existent corporation, that the motives, grounds, beliefs, and evidence Defendants acted on did not amount to probable cause to commence or continue the proceedings, and that no reasonable attorney would have considered it to be tenable to initiate or continue the causes of action on its behalf;

(4) that not only in the commencement but also the continuation of the various suits did Cox/Koop/ARPI together with their various attorneys act with malice, ill will, evil motive, or such gross indifference or reckless disregard for the rights of Plaintiff as to amount to willful and wanton acts, which could be implied or inferred from a conscious disregard for the consequences, from a lack of probable cause, and from inadequate investigation and research on ARPI’s lack of standing and the courts’ lack of subject matter jurisdiction resulting in the ORDERS being VOID ab initio; and

(5) that all the VOID Orders that Cox/Koop/ARPI procured by committing fraud upon the courts with the presiding judges, the attorneys, and those involved in the cases caused Plaintiff ‘special injuries’ through wrongful foreclosure, fraudulent deficiency judgment ($283,407.06), false proofs of claims ($283,407.06), unlawful control and dominion of non-debtor properties by Sheriff’s wrongful auctions, physical interference with Plaintiff’s person: false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, etc., mental anguish physical and emotional distress, and loss of reputation, goodwill, and credit rating as a result of bankruptcy – irreparable damages to Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights to “life, liberty, and property”.

  1. ARPI’s lawyers-defendants have violated a sacred public trust which bestows the power to file and prosecute legal actions. These Defendants are a threat to the judicial system and deserving of the indignation and contempt of decent society. They must be punished to deter future wrongdoers.
  2. ARPI is also suspected of tax evasion, which was reported to the DA and the Sheriff but they chose to ignore the complaint and took no action — an example of selective prosecution and racial discrimination.
  3. The Statute of Limitations for the malicious prosecution action against Cox/Koop/ARPI and those involved in procuring the VOID Orders for ARPI, et al. will begin to run on the day when the VOID Orders are set aside and nullified.
  4. The primary issue in conspiracy cases where the attorney is a named defendant is whether the attorney is acting in pursuit of his or her professional duties to the client or is acting in concert with the client to commit a wrong. Although most courts require proof of an underlying claim in order to hold the attorney liable for conspiracy, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Morganroth v. Delorean, that attorneys who assisted their clients in fraudulent transfers were liable for civil conspiracy, even without proving an underlying claim of fraud. 123 F.3d. 374 (6th Cir. 1997). A review of conspiracy suits against attorneys reveals that Morganroth is somewhat of an anomaly. Despite the harsh ruling in Morganroth, most states have only been willing to charge attorneys with civil conspiracy or professional disciplinary violations if the plaintiff-creditors proved the underlying tortuous claim.
  5. The case record makes it clear that Chapman has been acting in concert with his clients, Cox/Koop/Anita’s, Gerken and Lennar, to commit wrongs of wrongful foreclosures, fraudulent transfers, fraudulent deficiency judgments, false proofs of claims against Plaintiff’s estate, and unlawful control and dominion of non-debtor properties through Trustee’s wrongful abandonment and Sheriff Browning’s unlawful auction. Thus, Chapman must be charged with civil conspiracy.
  6. Those attorneys, Chapman, George, Morrison, Haddad, Burch, et al., who helped Cox/Koop/ARPI procure VOID Orders/Judgments by committing fraud upon the federal and state courts in conspiracy with the presiding judges and court clerks are conspirators.

VII. Legal Malpractice Claims against Roberts for Gross Negligence & Malice

Other Claims filed in Complaints # 2 & 5 in Case # V-06-78 are realleged herein.

  1. Texas courts have always recognized a cause of action for legal malpractice. See, e.g., Morrill v. Graham, 27 Tex. 646 (1864).
  2. Courts generally impose privity restrictions to prohibit the assignment of legal malpractice claims and impose additional rules for tolling the statute of limitations, and require the plaintiff to prove the “case within a case.” “An attorney malpractice action in Texas is based on negligence.” Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. 1989). Here, Plaintiff’s malpractice action against Roberts is based on negligence without investigating the standing of ARPI, which resulted in the wrongful foreclosure, fraudulent deficiency judgment, false proofs of claims, unlawful control and dominion of non-debtor’s properties and Plaintiff’s financial disasters in bankruptcy.
  3. It is well established that a traditional legal malpractice claim sounds in tort.
  4. A plaintiff in a legal malpractice claim must prove the following elements: (1) there is duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (4) that damages occurred. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d at 665. Here, Plaintiff can clearly and convincingly prove the following elements: (1) there is duty owed to Plaintiff by Defendants, R & his law firm; (2) a breach of that duty to use care to protect Plaintiff’s interest as defense counsel; (3) that the breach, non-investigation of ARPI’s standing proximately caused Plaintiff financial injury; and (4) that damages: deprivation of “life, liberty, and property” occurred continuously.
  5. In general, to establish the element of duty the plaintiff must prove that an attorney-client relationship existed with respect to the matter at issue. A person who was not a client may not sue an attorney for legal malpractice. See Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996). Here, an attorney-client relationship existed between P and R with respect to the matters at issue, the VOID Orders/Judgments that ARPI obtained by fraud upon the federal and state courts, which were due to defense counsel R’s gross negligence.
  1. The plaintiff’s burden of      proving the existence of any attorney-client relationship is commonly referred      to as the “privity” requirement. The determination of whether an      attorney-client relationship exists must be based on an objective      standard, not on the parties’ subjective beliefs. See SMWNPF Holdings,      Inc. v. Devore, 165 F.3d 360, 364-65 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, the      existence of any attorney-client relationship between R and P is      undeniable and Roberts      admitted in open court on July 15, 2010. Thus, the “privity” requirement      is satisfied.
  2. To establish a breach of duty      giving rise to a claim for legal malpractice, the client must show that      the lawyer failed to comply with the applicable standard of care. In      general terms, an attorney breaches the duty of care when the lawyer does      something an ordinarily prudent lawyer would not have done, or fails to do      something an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have done, under the same or      similar circumstances. The Texas Supreme Court has expressed the standard      of care in this way: A lawyer in Texas is held to the standard of care      which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney. The jury must      evaluate his conduct based on the information the attorney has at the time      of the alleged act of negligence. . . . Here, Roberts failed to comply with the applicable standard of      care. He breached the duty of care when he neglected to investigate the      lack of standing of ARPI that an ordinarily prudent lawyer would not have      done, or failed to investigate ARPI’s standing in the suit he served as      P’s defense counsel that an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have done,      under the same or similar circumstances. The Texas Supreme Court has      expressed the standard of care in this way: A lawyer in Texas is held to      the standard of care which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent      attorney. The jury must evaluate his conduct based on the information the      attorney has at the time of the alleged act of gross negligence.
  3. Although the locality rule has      been criticized, Texas law still requires the trier of fact to compare the      lawyer’s conduct to the standard of care in the lawyer’s community. See      Tijerina v. Wennermark, 700 S.W.2d 342, 347 (Tex. App.—San Antonio      1985, no writ); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ.      App.—San Antonio 1966, no writ). Here, Roberts’s gross negligence causing P’s total financial      disaster is unforgivable in any community.
  4. A lawyer who holds herself out      as a specialist is      generally expected to possess a higher degree of skill and learning than a      general practitioner, and accordingly may be judged by an equivalently      higher standard of care. Rhodes v. Batilla, 848 S.W.2d 833, 842      (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Streber v.      Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 722 (5th Cir. 2000). Roberts, being a specialist in real estate transactions, is      expected to possess a higher degree of skill and learning than a general      practitioner, and accordingly may be judged by an equivalently higher      standard of care. Defending a case without knowing the Plaintiff’s lack of      standing to sue in the first place is totally inexcusable and      unforgivable.
  5. As in traditional negligence      cases, the plaintiff in a legal malpractice case must prove that the      alleged malpractice was the proximate cause of injury. Cosgrove v.      Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989). Proximate cause consists of      two elements: (1) cause in fact and (2) foreseeability. McClure v.      Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1980).      Here, Plaintiff can prove that the alleged      malpractice was the proximate cause of injury: upon losing the deficiency      judgment hearing without knowing that ARPI lacked standing to sue, Roberts suggested that Plaintiff      file bankruptcy leading to Plaintiff’s subsequent financial      disasters. Both elements of proximate cause: (1) cause in fact: no      investigation of ARPI’s standing caused the deficiency judgment of      $283,407.06 against Plaintiff and (2) foreseeability: Had Roberts exercised the standard of      care which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney, there      would have been no $283,407.06 deficiency judgment and Plaintiff would not      have been forced into bankruptcy, losing his life savings and owing      creditors $34,999,640.91 as of11/25/1996.
  6. “Cause in fact means that the      act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and      without which no harm would have occurred.” McClure v. Allied Stores of      Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1980). The cause in fact      requirement has also been referred to as the “but for” test, because the plaintiff must show that the      injury would not have occurred “but for” the alleged breach of duty. But      the Texas Supreme Court has made clear that a “but for” showing alone is      not enough; to qualify as cause in fact the negligence must also have been a substantial factor in      bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. Union Pump Co. v.      Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995). Here, R’s act or omission      to investigate ARPI’s standing was a substantial factor in bringing about      the disastrous financial injury and without Roberts’s gross negligence no harm would have occurred.”      Plaintiff can show that the injury would not have occurred “but for” the      alleged breach of duty, which was      a substantial factor in bringing about Plaintiff’s financial harm.
  7. The foreseeability element of      proximate cause requires proof that the defendant, as a person of ordinary      intelligence, should have anticipated the danger to others by his      negligent act. See, e.g., Dyer v. Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, McCollum      &Ashley, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1989, writ      denied) (bankruptcy of client was not reasonably foreseeable). Even if Roberts were a person of ordinary      intelligence, not to speak of his being a prominent seasoned real estate      attorney, he should have anticipated the danger to Plaintiff by his      negligent act in defending against Plaintiff’s $283,407.06 deficiency      judgment without knowing that the case had no merits, that ARPI had no      standing to sue, and that Judge Stephen Kemper Williams had no subject      matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
  8. Based on the above facts,      Plaintiff firmly establishes that Roberts’s      conduct was the proximate cause of the $283,407.06 damages of fraudulent      deficient judgment in question.
  9. The      “Case Within a Case” Requirement.      When the alleged malpractice relates to a claim that      was litigated, the plaintiff must prove that a more favorable judgment      would have resulted if the case had been handled competently. This is      known as the “case within a case” requirement. In litigation      malpractice cases, therefore, the trial of the legal malpractice case      actually involves proving two cases: 1) the malpractice case against the lawyer, and 2) the hypothetical,      malpractice-free underlying case. See Jackson v. Urban,      Coolidge, Pennington & Scott, 516 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ.      App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref’dn.r.e.).
  10. Plaintiff’s 3/30/2011      discovery of ARPI’s expiration of the      Assumed Name Certificate without renewal since June 6,      1993 proves that ARPI, having been factually and legally      non-existent, conducted the wrongful foreclosure sale on July 2, 1996 in      violation of the prohibited close association between      Trustee/husband/co-owner and bidder/wife/owner of ARPI.  Had Roberts done sufficient investigations about ARPI,      discovered its violation of the Texas Deed of Trust law, its      lack of standing to sue, and the Court’s lack of subject      matter jurisdiction, the foreclosure      sale would have been set aside, the deficiency judgment of      $283,407.06 would not have been rendered, and Plaintiff would not have      filed bankruptcy, which wiped out all his investments and resulted in      owing creditors $34,999,640.91 as of11/25/1996 when the petition was      filed.
  11. Plaintiff asserts that when the legal malpractice case is tried,      the jury must decide how a reasonable jury would have resolved the issues      in the underlying foreclosure sale and      the $283,407.06 deficiency judgment case if Roberts’s alleged malpractice of insufficiency of      investigations had not occurred,      ARPI’s lack of standing and the court’s lack      of subject matter jurisdiction had      been discovered in time.
  12. A plaintiff in a      legal malpractice case may seek to recover foreseeable damages proximately      caused by the negligent act or omission. In the litigation context, this      is usually the amount that the client would have collected, or would      have avoided paying, if the litigation had been properly handled. See,      e.g., Keck, Mahin& Cate v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 20 S.W.3d      692, 703 (Tex. 2000) (damages were to be calculated by comparing amount      paid to settle case with amount that would have been lost at competently      defended trial); Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex.      1989) (jury should have been asked to determine the amount of damages      “collectible from Stephens if the suit had been properly      prosecuted”). Here, Plaintiff may seek to recover foreseeable damages      proximately caused by Roberts’s      grossly negligent act or omission. In the litigation context, this is the wrongful      foreclosure sale of 7/2/1996 that would have been set aside, the $283,407.06      deficiency judgment that Plaintiff would have avoided, and      the bankruptcy, which wiped out all his assets      and resulted in $34,999,640.91debtswould      not have taken place if Roberts had properly handled the      litigation.
  13. While a malicious prosecution cause of action addresses      maliciously-filed lawsuits that cause special injury, an abuse of process      claim requires an illegal or improper use of legal process. The      defendant must use legal process in a manner or purpose for which it was      not intended, such as engaging in the wrongful use of a writ or in some      abuse in the execution or service of a citation. Detenbeck v. Koester,      886 S.W.2d 477, 480-81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).      Here, Cox/Koop/ARPI’s maliciously-filed lawsuits that caused Plaintiff      special injuries constituted an abuse of process, an illegal or improper      use of the legal process without probable cause: wrongful foreclosure,      fraudulent deficiency judgment, false proofs of claims, and unlawful control      and dominion of non-debtor properties through Sheriff’s illegal auctions.      Defendants Cox/Koop/ARPI and their attorneys used the legal processes in a      manner or purpose for which they were not intended.
  14. Exemplary damages are only      recoverable in a legal malpractice case if the plaintiff proves by “clear and convincing evidence” that the      harm resulted from fraud, malice or gross negligence. TEX. CIV.      PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003. “Malice” means a specific intent to cause      the plaintiff substantial injury or harm. Id. § 41.001(7). “Gross      negligence” means an act or commission involving an “extreme degree of      risk,” carried out with actual, subjective awareness of the risk and conscious indifference to the rights,      safety or welfare of others. Id. § 41.001(11). Exemplary      damages may be awarded only if the jury was unanimous in finding liability      for and the amount of exemplary damages. Here, exemplary damages are      recoverable in that Plaintiff proves by “clear and convincing evidence” that the harm resulted from fraud,      malice or gross negligence. Roberts’s act or commission involving      “malice” with a specific intent to cause Plaintiff substantial injury or      harm in furtherance of the criminal charges against P without probable      cause leading to the false arrest, wrongful imprisonment and malicious      prosecution, and in the defense of Plaintiff’s      foreclosure and deficiency judgment cases involving an “extreme degree of      risk,” carried out with actual, subjective awareness of the risk and conscious indifference to      Plaintiff’s  rights, safety or      welfare causing Plaintiff’s total financial disasters.
  15. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE      § 41.008 limits the amount of exemplary damages available in most cases. Unless the alleged      malpractice also constitutes a felony      listed in § 41.008(c), exemplary damages are capped at two times the economic damages or $200,000, whichever is      greater. (Additional amounts are available if non-economic damages are recovered).
  16. Roberts’s      gross negligence caused Plaintiff enormous economic damages: 1) loss of $525,000 land in wrongful foreclosure; 2)      $283,407.06 fraudulent deficiency      judgment; 3) loss of all assets and bankruptcy debts of $34,999,640.91. Besides, R’s procurement of the DA’s prosecution      resulted in Plaintiff’s non-economic      damages: false arrest,      wrongful imprisonment, and malicious prosecution in addition to infliction      of mental anguish and emotional distress.
  17. A legal malpractice claim      accrues when the client suffers legal injury, meaning that facts have come      into existence that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy. Apex      Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. 2001).Plaintiff’s      legal malpractice claim accrues when he suffers legal injury, meaning      that the facts of      ARPI’s lack of standing and the various courts’ lack of subject matter      jurisdiction to decide the cases ARPI initiated and continued to prosecute      have come into existence that authorize him      to seek a judicial remedy to have all the VOID Orders/Judgments set      aside.
  18. A person suffers legal injury      from faulty professional advice when the advice is taken. Murphy v.      Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tex. 1997). Nevertheless, in many cases      the limitations period is extended by one of two tolling doctrines. First, the “discovery rule” delays      accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knows or should know of      the wrongfully-caused injury. See Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41      S.W.3d at 120-21; KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp.,      988 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. 1999). Here, the limitations period is extended      by one of two tolling doctrines.      First, the “discovery rule” delays      accrual of the cause of action until March      30, 2011 when the Texas Secretary of State informed Plaintiff of the      wrongfully-caused injury – R’s insufficient investigation of ARPI’s lack      of standing as a result of the      expiration of its Assumed Name Certificate.
  19. Second, when an attorney      commits malpractice in the prosecution      or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of      limitations on a malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the      underlying claims are exhausted or the litigation is otherwise concluded. Apex      Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d at 119; Hughes v.      Mahaney&Higgens, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1991). Here, when Roberts committed malpractice in      the defense of the $283,407.06 deficiency claim that resulted in      litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against      the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claims are      exhausted or the litigation is otherwise concluded. Since $283,407.06      deficiency judgment is found to be VOID ab initio, it must be set      aside. Thus, the statute of limitations is tolled until the      7/2/1996 wrongful foreclosure and the $283,407.06      fraudulent deficiency judgment are      reversed, vacated, voided, nullified, or invalidated.
  20. Where “a person is prevented from exercising his      legal remedy by the pendency of legal proceedings, the time during which      he is thus prevented should not be counted against him in determining      whether limitations have barred his right.” Walker v. Hanes, 570 S.W.2d 534, 540      (Tex.Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref’dn.r.e.)      (limitations tolled while prior submission of same case was being      appealed); Cavitt v. Amsler, 242 S.W. 246, 249      (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1922, writ dism’d)      (limitations on suit for dividends tolled while suit to determine      ownership of stock was being appealed); Pease v. State, 228 S.W. 269, 270-71      (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1921, writ ref’d)      (plaintiff’s cause of action in suit for salary did not accrue until final      decision in quo warranto proceeding that defendant was not entitled to      job); Fields v. Austin, 30 S.W. 386, 387      (Tex.Civ.App.1895, writ ref’d) (cause of action for rent did      not accrue until appeals exhausted on suit to determine title to land).We      conclude that the rationale applied in these cases is also appropriate      when a client’s cause of action for malpractice arises during the      attorney’s prosecution or defense of a claim which results in litigation.      Limitations are tolled for the second cause of action because the      viability of the second cause of action depends on the outcome of the      first. Therefore,      we hold that when an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or      defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations      on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals      on the underlying claim are exhausted. We join other jurisdictions in      adopting this well-reasoned rule. See Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F.Supp. 561, 565      (N.D.Ill.1981) (applying Illinois law); Amfac Dist. Corp. v. Milter, 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d      792, 793 (1983); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell      & Co. v. Lane,      565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla.1990); Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa      1987); Semenza v. Nevada Medical      Liability Ins. Co.,      104 Nev. 666, 765 P.2d 184, 186 (1988). These      cases turn on other policy considerations unnecessary to our decision      today. See, e.g., Amfac Dist. Corp. v. Milter, 138 Ariz.      155, 673 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct.App.1983),aff’d as      supplemented,138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d 792,      793 (1983).

VIII. Denial of Equal Protection, Racial Discrimination and Selective Prosecution

  1. In order to establish and to plead a violation of equal protection based on selective enforcement, plaintiff must show: (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. Lisa’s Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1999).
  2. Rule 145 T.R.C.P. provides: Upon the filing of the Affidavit of Indigency, the clerk must docket the action, issue citation and provide such other customary services as are provided any party.
  3. In light of the above provisions, the Clerks of both Federal and State courts “shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases” and “must docket the action, issue citation and provide such other customary services as are provided any party” respectively.
  4. They are either ignorant of or indifferent to such rules aimed at helping indigents gain access to the court to redress grievances protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
  5. Here, Rule 145 T.R.C.P. was not being implemented properly. Plaintiff suffered individualized injuries because his First Amendment right to access the court for redress of grievances was invaded.
  6. The Clerk’s refusal to comply with Rule 145 T.R.C.P. that she “must docket the action, issue citation and provide such other customary services as are provided any party” made it impossible for Plaintiff to get the claims timely initiated. The Clerk shall be held liable for Plaintiff’s losses in the event his claims are time-barred as a result of the Clerk’s inaction in docketing the action, issuing citations, serving Plaintiff’s pleadings to the Defendants, and providing such other customary services as are provided any party.
  1. “A      selective prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal      charge itself, but an independent assertion that the prosecutor has      brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.”[1]      United States v. Armstrong, 517      U.S. 456 (1996)
  2. Plaintiff      contends that persons of white race      such as Cox/Koop/ARPI, John Gerken, Lennar Florida Partners, Greg Martin,      Woody Obrig, were not prosecuted while Plaintiff and the 18 named      Taiwanese investors were maliciously prosecuted because of a bias in      violation of the 14th      Amendment, which requires that “nor      shall any state      deny to any person within its jurisdiction      the equal      protection of the laws.”
  3. On December      8, 2011 Plaintiff sent by CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED the      DECLARATION OF PAUL CHEN IN SUPPORT OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT [1]Against Anita’s Resort      Property, Inc., Anita L. Koop, and Terry J. Cox with Attachment A:      Certificate of Fact to Defendants      Sheriff B.B. Browning, and Assistant DA Shannon Salyer for execution.      The receipts were signed and returned but there has been neither reply to Plaintiff      nor      any action taken against Cox/Koop/ARPI for violation of Sec. 71.202 (criminal charges: Class A misdemeanor) of the BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE since      June 6, 1993 and ongoing.

IX. Neither the Clerks nor the Judges, State and Federal, are Familiar with the Laws Protecting Indigents

153.                      28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) provides: “The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases.”

Some Void Orders Subject to Reversal, Vacatur, Invalidation, and Nullification

JUDGE WESLEY W. STEEN’S 11 VOID ORDERS

154. ORDER PERMITTING WITHDRAWAL  (# 299)  — Record Excerpt 4

(Related Doc # 298) Signed on 9/26/2002 (Entered: 10/01/2002)

155.  Void Order 2:  ORDER APPROVING TRUSTEE’S FINAL REPORT

Unsigned & unrecorded  — Record Excerpt 5Hearing on 10/8/2002.

— See Case No. 96-24925-VS-7 Docket (#302)

156. Void Order 3:  ORDER APPROVING TRUSTEE S FEES AND EXPENSES

Signed on 10/8/2002 (Entered: 10/09/2002) — Record Excerpt 6

— See Case No. 96-24925-VS-7 Docket (#301)

157. Void Order 4:  FINAL DECREE   Signed on 6/5/2003  (Entered: 06/06/2003)

— Record Excerpt 7      Entry of Decree violated due process.

— See Case No. 96-24925-VS-7 Docket (#315)

158. Void Order 5:  ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN by late-filed Claimants         Unrecorded  — Record Excerpt 9

Docket report shows: “Motion denied for want of proper prosecution. (bcar)

(Entered: 2/15/2003)”, but there was no entry of Order on record.

— See Case No. 96-24925-VS-7 Docket(#323) 323 MOTION TO REOPEN CASE, VACATE ORDERS AND RELITIGATE OBJECTION TO TRUSTEE’S FINAL REPORT by Late-filed Claimants  12/09/2003  ——- Record Excerpt 8

159. Void Order 6:  ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN by Appellant (# 370)  — Record Excerpt 10 (Related Doc # 368)   Signed on 6/7/2004  (Entered: 06/09/2004)

160. Void Order 7:  ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (#374)  — Record Excerpt 11  (Related Doc # 373) Signed on 6/27/2004 (Entered: 06/29/2004)

161. Void Order 8:  Order Approving Settlement Agreement

No date, no signatures.

Even if it was dated and signed by the presiding judge, it would be voidable in that the Taiwanese through Chen objected to the Settlement Agreement in writing twice and their approval and signatures were never obtained.

162.Void Order 9: Agreed Order Approving Trustee’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Based on Void Order 8, it was void ab intio.

(See Complaint #1 COUNT 1, VI. Vacatur of Summary Judgment & Agreed Final Judgment)

Where the record fails affirmatively to show jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants, a summary judgment, is fundamentally erroneous. •  Peterson & Tvrdik v Mueller-Huber Grain Co., 58 SW2d 890 at 892 (Texas 1933).
Also cited with approval in •  Reynolds v Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 SW2d 1087 at 1093 (Texas 1935)

163.Void Order 10: Agreed Final Judgment

The Agreed Final Judgment was void ab initio because it was based on Void Order 8: Order Approving Settlement Agreement and Void Order 9: Agreed Order Approving Trustee’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

(See Complaint #1 COUNT 1, VI. Vacatur of Summary Judgment & Agreed Final Judgment)

164.Void Order 11 (09/01/2004):

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL AND OTHER REQUESTED RELIEF (doc# 382)

This Order was void ab initio in that Judge Steen had neither subject matter nor personal jurisdiction over the MOTION which had been assigned to the District Court for adjudication.

165.JUDGE VANESSA GILMORE’S VOID ORDERS WITHOUT EITHER SUBJECT MATTER OR PERSONAL JURISDICTION

In Civil Action Case No. 02-4794, Lead Case No. 4:04cv3084 and Member Case No.4: 04cv3426, Consolidated Case No. H:04-CV-3084, Judge Gilmore rendered numerous VOID Orders without any subject matter jurisdiction in that there was no final order or judgment to appeal from, and that Void Order 2:  ORDER APPROVING TRUSTEE’S FINAL REPORT was neither signed nor recorded in the docket

166.Judge Rainey’s Orders in Cases Numbered 6:05-mc-00002, V-06-78, and V-ms-11 were rendered without subject matter jurisdiction in violation of of Title 28 Section 1915(d)(e)(1) and Rule 1-041(E)(2) of Rules Enabling Act.

167.Judge Jack’s Void Orders/Judgments in Case Numbered 610-cv-00056 were rendered without subject matter jurisdiction in violation of Title 28 Section 1915(d)(e)(1) and Rule 1-041(E)(2) of Rules Enabling Act. They must be set aside.

168.ARPI #1 ARPI’s ASSUMED NAME CERTIFICATE EXPIRED on 6/6/93.

On 3/30/11 the Secretary of State issued the Certificate of Fact, testifying that Anita’s Resort Properties, Inc. had its assumed name certificate filed on June 06, 1983, but the status was: Expired.

169.ARPI #2 6 10 96— 6 6 93 EXPIRED Notice of Trustee Sale

This Notice was posted on 6/10/96, 3 years and 4 days after ARPI’s Certificate expired.

170. ARPI #3 7 2 96— 6 6 93 EXPIRED Trustees Deed

(1) This Deed was executed on 7/2/96 by Terry Cox, Trustee, who denied being an officer of ARPI, and breached the 2nd 30-day postponement agreement he signed, and sold the mortgaged land to his wife’s defunct corporation, ARPI, of which court documents show that he is Co-owner/Trustee/Agent with full power to sign any binding agreement. This was one of a series of deceptive business practices in which Cox/Koop/ARPI have engaged since the sale/purchase agreement was consummated on 9/15/1989. And this lie opened the door of their wrongful acts, which forced Chen into bankruptcy and reduced him to indigency.

(2) The wrongful foreclosure sale violated the close association prohibition between the Trustee of a Deed of Trust and any bidder, in this case, his wife.

(3) On 7/2/96 Cox deeded the property to the defunct ARPI, whose Certificate had expired 3 years and 26 days before.

(4) Thus, this Deed was and still is VOID. It must be set aside.

171. ARPI #4 8 15 97—6 6 93 EXPIRED Abstract of Judgement

This Abstract was certified on 8/15/97, 3 years, 2 months and 9 days

after ARPI’s Certificate expired. Being invalid, it must be set aside.

172. ARPI #5 6 20 1997 SUMMARY Judgment by Judge Williams

(1) This Summary Judgment was rendered for ARPI on 6/20/97, 4 years and 14 days

after its Certificate expired.

(2) Being invalid, this Summary Judgment must be set aside.

173. ARPI #6 1 17 2001 $10 AK FRAUD Sheriffs Deed Canals, Well, etc.

(1) This Sheriff’s Deed is the most outrageous misconduct of all officials involved, including Judge Wesley Steen, Trustee Mike Boudloche, attorneys: John Vardeman, Michael Schmidt, Richard T. Chapman, Thomas George; Terry Cox, Anita Koop, ARPI, et al.

(2) The property legally belonged to Sunilandings Homeowners Association, of which all the lot/homeowners were and are mandatory members. Each lot is entitled to one vote; the more lots one owns, the more votes cast. How could such public property have been auctioned at a high price of $10, and resold at a low price of $145,000?

(3) (Can you imagine Pres. Anita Koop paid Sheriff Browning $10 and resold the properties for $145,000?)

(4) Being invalid, this Sheriff’s Deed must be set aside.

174. ARPI #7 96– 6 6 93 EXPIRED Judgement

Oral argument took place in Calhoun County Courtroom.

Counsel for ARPI: Thomas George  Counsel for Chen: David Roberts

This Judgement was not signed and not submitted here. Discovery required.

175. ARPI #8 5 10 2004 Sheriffs Deed Real Property

(1) This Deed was executed by Sheriff Browning for Anita L. Koop on 5/10/04, 3 months and 8 days after the Taiwanese Investors/Owners had paid off the delinquent property taxes with steep penalties and properly recorded the Deed of Trust at the Calhoun County Clerk’s Office.

(2) Anita L. Koop allegedly paid $158,000 out of ARPI’s $283,407.06 false claims. However, the beneficiary of the $525,000 Note secured by the 9/15/1989 Deed of Trust was ARPI, not Anita L. Koop. ARPI is not Anita L. Koop. How could one be the other while ARPI was defunct?

(3) Being invalid, this Sheriff’s Deed must be set aside.

It was based on this VOID Sheriff’s Deed that Anita L. Koop issued Warranty Deeds to defraud her purchasers, whose recourse today is to sue Cox/Koop/ARPI for damages, not to sue Chen or the duly appointed Substitute Trustee. By doing so, they are barking at the wrong trees. Buyers be aware! Their lack of title insurance policies may be the root of their problems.

Essentially, thinking it was a steal, they bought poisoned apples!

176. ARPI #9 11 30 10 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(1) This Summary Judgment was rendered without any hearing for ARPI by Judge Skipper Koetter on 11/30/2010, more than 17 years after its Certificate expired.

(2) The defunct ARPI had no standing to bring suit before the court.

(3) Judge Koetter had no subject matter jurisdiction to determine the action or to hear the case.

(4) “Subject matter jurisdiction is the court’s authority to decide the issue in controversy such as a contracts issue, or a civil rights issue. “Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter, any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and, for the exercise of such authority when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 n.6 (1978).

(5) ”No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (1978); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 220, 1 S.Ct. at 261 (1882).

(6) Being invalid, this Summary Judgment must be set aside.

177. ARPI #10 11 30 10 FINAL JUDGMENT

(1) This Final Judgment was rendered without any hearing for ARPI by Judge Skipper Koetter on 11/30/2010, more than 17 years after its Certificate expired.

(2) Like the Summary Judgment, it is VOID ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

(3) This Final Judgment must be set aside.

178. ARPI #11 Jackson County Default Judgment

(1) This Default Judgment was rendered without any hearing for ARPI by Judge Skipper Koetter on 7/16/2010, more than 17 years after its Certificate expired.

(2) Like the Summary Judgment and Final Judgment above, it is VOID ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   (3) This Default Judgment must be set aside.

179. CAUSE NO. 12-4-1596: The Temporary Injunction issued by Judge Skipper Koetter on April 11, 2012 without subject matter jurisdiction must be set aside. See AMENDED DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION&AMENDED DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFF’S COUNTERCLAIMS AND AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF filed on April 11, 2012.


[1]

Posted by Paul Chen: ricofraudonthecourt@wordpress.com
E-mail: ricofraudonthecourt@yahoo.com
Inquiries by e-mail only. No phone calls, please.

 

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Corrupt judges like John D. Rainey, Janis Graham Jack, S. Thomas Anderson, Skipper Koetter, Kemper Stephen Williams; unethical lawyers like Richard T. Chapman, David Roberts, Randal W. Hill, Jameson B. Carroll, Emily T. Landry, Ron McAfee, Edward Bearman; ignorant/discriminatory ADA Shannon Salyer, Sheriff B.B. Browning & Magistrate Hope Kurtz, crooks and fraudsters like Terry J. Cox, Anita L. Koop, and those named and unnamed in my posts: They have seized upon the government by bribery and corruption. They have made speculation and public robbery a science. They have loaded the nation, the state, the county, and the city with debt. — Quotes from Denis Kearney (1847–1907), a late 19th century California labor leader, applied to some Texas’s and Tennessee’s rotten, immoral, despicable OFFICERS OF THE COURT and two major crooks and fraudsters.

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Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom.

While teaching, I also worked undercover in the lower courts by saying I was a young law teacher wanting experience in criminal law. The judges were happy to assist me but what I learned was how corrupt the lower courts were. Judges were accepting money right in the courtroom. —  Samuel Dash

Samuel Dash (February 27, 1925 – May 29, 2004) was an American professor of law who acted as a co-chief counsel along with Fred Thompson for the Senate Watergate Committee during the Watergate scandal. Dash became famous for his televised interrogations during the hearings held by the United States Congress on the Watergate incident. — From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ha! Judge Skipper Koetter seems a lot wiser in that he concealed the moneys under the cover of campaign contributions and that he managed not to accept money in the courtroom, I guess.  But a reasonable man cannot rule out his accepting money in his chambers, bedchambers, or living room, can he? One of my former attorneys mentioned that the most effective way for money to change hands had been knowingly and willfully losing the chips to the judge in the poker game in a private group. See Judge Skipper Koetter’s Campaign Finance Suspected of Bribery Posted on September 29, 2012.

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